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ABSTRACT
EQUILIBRIUM MODELING AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF A BIOFUEL
SUPPLY CHAIN WITH A HYDROELECTRIC RESERVOIR
by
Jinwoo Bae

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019
Under the Supervision of Professor Jaejin Jang

This research proposed a game theoretic model of a biofuel supply chain (BSC) where a
utility company supplies reservoir water to two farmers, located in downstream and upstream
of a hydropower dam. The decision-making process of the model is formulated as a threestage Stackelberg game. We analyze the equilibrium of the decentralized systems and the
effect of the government subsidy on energy crop (switchgrass) production for cellulosic
biofuel industries, with two forms of subsidy: (1) discriminated subsidies and (2) equalized
subsidies.
The results show that both forms of subsidy improve social welfare in the BSC unless the
amount of subsidy exceeds certain limits, in which case there are negative margins for the
farmers, and disappearance or monopoly of the markets. Increasing the subsidy to the
upstream farmer is more efficient in improving social welfare than equalizing the subsidies to
the two farmers. Increasing the subsidy to the downstream farmer shows the least efficiency
in improving social welfare.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Water, energy, and food are essential resources. Since demand for these resources for
human activities, technologies, industries, and even survival. Since the demand for these
resources has been rising steadily with increase in the world’s population and industrial
development, resource security is becoming a major issue for policymakers and government
departments. Currently, the rapid population growth in many regions of the world and
associated economic development are increasing demand for electricity and putting pressure
on freshwater resources (IEA, 2012). The population increase could also threaten food security.
It is estimated that energy consumption worldwide in particular will have increased by 50%
upto 2030 (Hightower and Pierce, 2008). These factors will exacerbate the energy crises and
water shortages in the world (Zhang and Vesselinov, 2016). Thus, we need to approach the
water-energy-food nexus through an understanding of the interaction between the water,
energy, and food sectors in order to improve their security.
Security of water, energy, and food is inextricably linked, and therefore they should not
only be carefully managed as individual resources but also be understood in the perspective of
the interaction between them. The proper management of their connection should be given
priority, as it has significant potential to increase the efficiency of resource allocation and
1

utilization and to reduce social costs. A comprehensive understanding of the resource use and
flow would help induce and maintain equilibrium of supply and demand, as against an
imbalance that may result in inefficient resource allocation and the consequent excessive social
costs. Efficiency of use of the water, energy, and food system could be improved and managed
effectively through an analysis of the interaction between the three resource sectors.
Conventional policy and decision-making processes need to adopt a nexus approach which
would reduce the trade-offs and build synergies across whole sectors through integration (Hoff,
2011). The water–energy–food (WEF) nexus is an approach to assessment, policy
development, and implementation that focuses on water, energy, and food security
simultaneously (Bizikova et al., 2014). The 2011 Bonn conference provides evidence that
improved water, energy, and food security can be achieved through the nexus approach that
integrates management and governance across the three sectors, supporting the transition to a
green economy that has greater policy coherence and uses resources more efficiently (Hoff,
2011).
Amidst research on the water-energy-food nexus, research on the biofuel supply chain
(BSC) is one of the most rapidly developing areas, since biofuel is a promising renewable
energy source that can substitute for scarce fossil fuels. Until now, it has been produced mainly
2

from food (first-generation) crops such as corn. In recent years, 40% of US corn was converted
into ethanol (GRACE, 2014). However, biofuels are responsible for a 25–60% increase in corn
prices (Sexton et al., 2009). In addition to price, land availability is an important factor affecting
food security (Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın, 2015). Dependence on biofuel from food crops
could undermine the security of food supplies such as corn (Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın,
2017).

Cellulosic ethanol, refined from energy (second-generation) crops, is one of the most
promising alternatives to food-based bioethanol. Switchgrass, especially, one of the cellulosic
feedstocks, is widely recognized as a leading crop for ethanol production in the U.S. according
to social, economic, and environmental criteria (Bai et al., 2010). Based on life cycle
assessment (LCA), the production of switchgrass ethanol has been shown to cause lower
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than that of corn-based ethanol, because of higher yield,
ability to store carbon in soil, and fewer fertilizer and energy inputs (Davis et al., 2012; Larson,
2006; Wright, 2010).

Security of water supply is vital for both first-generation and second-generation biofuel
crops, since a huge amount of water is consumed by irrigation. Agriculture accounts for the
largest consumptive water use which is not returned to a water source. If the return flow is
3

polluted or heated, that may also be considered consumptive use because the changed water
properties compromise further uses (Hoff, 2011). Agriculture consumes about 70% of fresh
water in the world and accounts for 80–90% of consumptive water use in the United States
(Pimentel et al., 2004; Schaible and Aillery, 2012).

As one of the largest consumers of water, agriculture competes directly with the energy
sector for water resources. However, agriculture also contributes indirectly to the energy sector
through biofuel production. Both connections will be strained by increasing concerns over
water availability and quality (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014).

Hydropower is another major source of renewable energy. In 2012, global hydroelectricity
generation reached 3,646 TWh, which accounted for about 77% of total renewable electricity
generation and it supplied 18% of the total electricity consumed (Zhang et al., 2018). Since
they are usually a domestic source of energy and water, hydropower plants with reservoirs
could help manage energy security and water security if the hydropower systems could be
developed as integrated systems for hydroelectricity generation and water supply (IEA, 2012).
Water stored in a hydropower reservoir can be used for irrigation, industry and domestic supply.
Since hydropower plants are usually located in upstream regions, the water released to generate
hydroelectricity can be made available for irrigation in the downstream regions (Zhang et al.,
4

2018). In other words, the water stored in reservoirs and the water released to the downstream
areas can be used for irrigation in upstream regions and downstream regions, respectively. So,
considering hydropower systems with water supply for irrigation could improve food security
(Water Resources and Environment Administration, 2008).

Water systems supply water for human use such as drinking, irrigation, or industry.
Although water is a public resource for everyone, excessive use and unequal water supply
would cause scarcity of water and compromise the right to equal access to water. Water pricing
could be a key factor in promoting efficient resource allocation and preventing anyone’s
exclusive possession of water. In this context, the price does not need to be the same for all
units sold; non-linear pricing is shown to permit people to enjoy low prices for their essential
uses of water but pay higher prices if they consume beyond a certain threshold quantity. Nonlinear marginal cost pricing of water permits separation of the relatively more essential (low
volume, low demand elasticity) uses of water from the more optional (high volume, higher
demand elasticity) uses of water. On the supply side, many sources of water are shared in
“common” and therefore unregulated markets tend to deplete and degrade sources of water at
rates greater than the efficient rates (Holahan, 2010). In this research, it is assumed that water
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price is imposed in the form of a convex quadratic price function to reconcile the supply
imbalance.

In this research, our model considers a utility company as a private water supply firm that
tries to maximize its own profit rather than other values such as social welfare. In economics,
a private firm maximizes its own profit while a public firm maximizes social welfare, in general.
However, in the privatization neutrality theorem, social welfare is the same before and after
privatization when the government gives optimal subsidies to both public and private firms.
Fulton and Karp (1989) studied the performance of a public firm in a natural-resource industry
and concluded that the public firm pursues objectives other than welfare maximization. As
shown in previous research, private firms and public firms may make decisions for the same
objective of profit maximization. Thus, while this research assumes that the utility company is
a private firm, it could be regarded as a kind of public firm under certain conditions. However,
this paper only focuses on the situation in which the utility company pursues profit
maximization rather than social welfare maximization.

6

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section reviews research on the biofuel supply chain (BSC) and game theory in waterenergy-food nexus.

2.1. Biofuel Supply Chain

The BSC, one of the most popular research areas in the water- energy-food nexus, had been
developing even before the concept of the water-energy-food nexus appeared. Our model is
also based on the BSC and incorporates the conventional BSC with water supply and
hydropower generation.

Several studies on the BSC have been formulated in centralized optimization models,
where a single decision maker makes a decision to maximize or minimize the objective
function (Del-Mas et al., 2011; Awudu and Zhang, 2013; Marufuzzaman et al., 2014; Xie et
al., 2014; Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın, 2014; Kim et al., 2011). For example, Xie et al. (2014)
proposed a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model to minimize transportation costs
of cellulosic feedstock through optimal location of biorefineries, hubs, and terminals.
Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın (2014) developed a MILP model to find best decisions on
seeding method, harvesting time, and land types, while considering the economic and
7

environmental impacts of switchgrass biomass production. Kim et al. (2011) developed a MILP
model to maximize profits of biofuel production through best transportation method, biomass
locations, and biorefinery capacity and technologies. Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın, (2015)
proposed a multi-objective mixed-integer optimization model to maximize economic and
environmental benefits with optimal decisions on land allocation, seeding time, harvesting time
and amount, and budget allocation. Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın (2017) extended their
previous model to a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming model. Azadeh et al.
(2014) proposed a stochastic linear programming model within a multi-period planning
framework to maximize the expected profit. Papapostolou et al. (2011) proposed a mixed
integer linear programming model to maximize performance of the BSC.

Compared to the centralized framework, the BSC model with a decentralized framework
could better consider and analyze rational behaviors of each entity in the BSC (e.g. farmers
and refineries). The entities, as decision makers in the model, make decisions independently to
optimize their own objectives which can be in conflict with one another. Bai et al. (2012)
proposed a bilevel Stackelberg leader-follower game theoretic model of an integrated BSC
with farmers’ decision on land uses and markets, and dynamic feedstock prices under market
equilibrium. Under the decentralized framework, the government policy can be applied to the
8

BSC model as a form of regulation or subsidy. Bai et al (2016) proposed a Stackelberg game
theoretic model to incorporate more options on land use and possibility of marginal land
reclamation in a land market, with cap-and-trade regulatory mechanism for land-use constraints.
Luo and Miller (2013) proposed a game theoretic model of Cournot competition between
farmers and Stackelberg between switchgrass and corn ethanol producers, while considering
the farmers and the ethanol producers. However, this research does not study the socioeconomic impact of the subsidies on the BSC. Another game theoretical model, proposed by
Bajgiran (2018), is modeled as a Cournot-Stackelberg game between a farmer and multiple
biofuel refineries, and analyzes the effect of government subsidies on the BSC.

Besides the abovementioned research, mathematical programming models of the BSC
have been developed, in a variety of research papers. Sharma et al. (2013) reviewed 32 research
papers to analyze mathematical programming models for the BSC with focus on facility
location and capacity. De Meyer et al. (2014) reviewed 71 research papers on biomass-forbioenergy supply chain with focus on optimization methods used in the BSC. Ghaderi et al.
(2016) reviewed 146 research papers on biomass supply chain network design (BSCND) and
classified them into three classes: facility-related, biomass-related, and final product-related.
Of the 146 papers, none considers decisions regarding water supply and irrigation for biomass
9

production with BSC. Most of the research studied determination of facility capacity and
location, biomass type, land allocation, and final products type.

Although there is a variety of research on the mathematical modeling of the BSC, Ghaderi
et al. (2016) addressed the lack of multi-objective problem research which accounts for only
22.6% of the BSC papers. Out of the 146 papers, only 14 papers (9.6%) proposed non-linear
programming, which is more flexible and practical to deal with real-world problems than
mixed-integer linear programming (MILP), which is applied in 109 papers (74.6%) (Ghaderi
et al., 2016). Consequently, the BSC field needs more research on multi-objective problems
and non-linear programming approaches.

Hydropower systems can be integrated with irrigation for the biomass crops. For example,
Lacombe et al. (2014) studied the effect of hydropower development on irrigation in the Nam
Ngum River Basin. The research found that full hydropower development could increase river
flow during the dry season and improve water availability for irrigation. Since this research
only considers the impacts of development within the Nam Ngum sub-basin, additional
analysis of collective influences in the wider Mekong basin needs further research (Zhang et
al., 2018). However, to our knowledge, only a few researchers have studied the BSC with
hydropower systems and water supply systems for irrigation, although the integrated system
10

has a high potential to simultaneously consider a water system and the BSC in the waterenergy-food nexus.

In this research, we propose a mathematical model for decision-making on biomass type
and land allocation. Our BSC model also deals with hydropower generation and water supply
for irrigation, which has not been dealt with much in previous BSC research. The BSC model
is formulated as a non-linear programming with a three-stage Stackelberg game, where three
players maximize their own objectives (profits) in the game and the government also promotes
its objective (social welfare) out of the game. The Stackelberg game theoretic approach is
proposed to solve multi-objective problems. Moreover, our BSC model consists of two biomass
suppliers (farmers), two kinds of biofuel producers (biomass refineries) as a corn market and a
switchgrass market, and a water supplier (utility company) that operates a hydropower plant
and supplies water to the farmers for irrigation.

2.2. Game Theory in Water-Energy-Food Nexus

More than one decision maker can be involved, in the water-energy-food nexus. The
decision makers take decisions to achieve their own objectives, interacting with each other.
11

Game theory can provide a framework to study the strategic actions of individual decision
makers to develop acceptable solutions when the decisions of multiple firms mutually affect
the outcomes of other decision makers. Also, game theory could derive practical results under
conditions of competition between firms, since this method reflects the interaction between the
involved parties, which is often neglected by conventional optimization methods of solving
multi-criteria multi-decision-maker problems (Madani, 2010).

Hence, game theoretic approaches can be used to analyze the Nash equilibrium in a multistakeholder model for the water-energy-food nexus. Especially if one entity is more influential
than the others or is an external arbiter such as a regulating agent, and they want to manage
water, energy, and food flows between other parties, a leader-follower type game could prove
valuable (Garcia and You, 2016). The mathematical models could describe and explain the
rationalization of the players’ decisions and their results in the water-energy-food nexus.

There are three traditional competition models in game theory: a Cournot model, a
Bertrand model, and a Stackelberg model. The Bertrand model addresses price competition
between firms in a simultaneous game, while the Cournot model and the Stackelberg model
compete on the quantity produced in a simultaneous game and a sequential game, respectively.

12

The Cournot model was first proposed by a French mathematician, Antoine Augustin
Cournot in 1838 (Siriruk, 2009). The basic Cournot model is a static model where each firm
rationally forecasts other firms’ decisions. Given the forecast, firms simultaneously make the
decision to maximize their own profit (Varian, 2006). The Cournot competition is a quantity
competition where the firms make decisions on quantity rather than on price. In each firm’s
problem, the quantities supplied by other firms are assumed to be fixed and do not change
depending on price change (Siriruk, 2009). The Cournot model derives a Nash equilibrium
solution for the optimal quantities produced by each firm. The market price of the output is
determined by the equilibrium solution with a given demand function of the market. When
solving the single-level game, we can solve an optimization problem through putting together
KKT conditions of each firm’s problem.

The Bertrand competition was first studied by Joseph Bertrand who pointed out that firms
compete primarily in prices (Prokop et al., 2015). In the static model of price competition in
duopoly, two firms produce a homogeneous good at identical and constant marginal cost. This
game theoretical model is assumed to have no capacity constraint, so that each firm can satisfy
the entire demand of the market. The firms set prices of their products simultaneously and
independently. With identical prices quoted by the firms, the demand is split equally between
13

the two firms. On the other hand, with discriminated prices, a firm that quotes lower price takes
all the demand in the market since consumers would purchase the good at the lowest price. In
the case of the Bertrand game, the winner takes all demand while the other firm takes nothing.

The Stackelberg was first described by a German economist, Heinrich Freiherr von
Stackelberg, who in 1934 studied competition between two firms selling a homogeneous good
(Von Stackelberg et al., 2010). The concept of the Stackelberg game is extended to various
research areas to study situations containing a leader–follower relationship (Chu and You, 2014;
Chu et al., 2014). In a standard Stackelberg game, a leader takes actions first, and then a
follower makes best responses to the leader’s decisions rationally. Hence, the two players make
their best decisions sequentially in the Stackelberg game. In the game, the follower observes
the leader’s decisions and the leader knows the follower’s best responses to its decisions. The
leader has the advantage of moving first and the advantage lets the leader gain a larger profit
than the follower. On the other hand, if the leader does not guarantee a certain degree of
incentives to the follower, the follower may refuse to participate in the supply chain and the
leader’s strategic plan may become infeasible or unprofitable (Yue and You, 2014).

For example, a single-leader-single-follower Stackelberg game can be formulated as a
bilevel programming problem (Bard, 1998; Colson et al., 2007), as follows:
14

max 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑥∈𝑋

s. t. 𝐴𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 0

𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑚

s. t. 𝐵𝑗 (𝑥, 𝑦) = 0

𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑛

where 𝑦 solves max 𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑦∈𝑌

s. t. 𝐶𝑘 (𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 0

𝑘 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑟

s. t. 𝐷𝑙 (𝑥, 𝑦) = 0

𝑙 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑠

In this Stackelberg game, the leader’s decision variables are denoted by 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 and the
follower’s decision variables are denoted by 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌. The leader’s objective function, inequality
constraints, and equality constraints are denoted by 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑦) , 𝐴𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑦) , and 𝐵𝑗 (𝑥, 𝑦) ,
respectively. The function and the constraints depend on both the leader’s decisions, 𝑥, and
the follower’s decisions, 𝑦 . The follower’s objective function, inequality constraints, and
equality constraints are denoted by 𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦), 𝐶𝑘 (𝑥, 𝑦), and 𝐷𝑙 (𝑥, 𝑦), respectively.

The bilevel program is also called a “mathematical program that contains an optimization
problem in the constraints” (Bracken and McGill, 1973), because the value of 𝑦 in the leader’s
problem is obtained by solving the follower’s optimization problem. The leader’s decision
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variables 𝑥 are treated as given parameters in the follower’s optimization problem since the
leader’s decisions have already been made at the time when the follower takes actions.

When solving a bilevel game such as a leader-follower game, a lower-level optimization
problem usually can be embedded as constraints in an upper-level optimization problem. In
case the lower-level optimization problem is replaced with the form of equivalent variational
inequalities or KKT conditions, we can transform the bilevel problem into a single level
optimization problem that consists of equilibrium constraints (Bajgiran, 2018). Such single
level problems are called mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) (Luo
et al. 1996). MPECs have been extensively employed in various research areas and industries
including energy, transportation, and production. For example, Koh (2012), Allevi et al. (2018),
and Siddiqui and Christensen (2016) considered MPECs as non-linear programming (NPL),
and special algorithms have been developed to solve them.

In our biofuel supply chain, the two farmers compete for water allocations of the utility,
and each farmer solves a trilevel problem where the farmers (leaders) maximize their own
profit at the upper level problems and the lower level problems, and the utility company
(follower) maximizes its own profit at the middle level problem. Because of the convexity of
the farmers’ problems in the third stage, we can replace the problems with their KKT conditions
16

and embed them in the utility company’s problem in the second stage as new constraints and
solve the resultant single level problem (MPEC). Likewise, because of the convexity of the
utility company’s problem in the second stage, we can replace the problem with its KKT
conditions and embed the KKT conditions in the farmers’ problems in the first stage as new
constraints and solve the resultant single level problem (MPEC). Having derived the MPEC
for each of the farmers, we need to jointly consider all MPECs to obtain the generalized Nash
equilibrium, which is one of the main objectives of this research. For that, we obtain the KKT
conditions of each single level problem and combine them into one single optimization
problem. The new problem is called equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC),
which has been previously addressed in other works and industries, especially the electricity
market (e.g, Pozo and Contreras 2011; Ruiz et al., 2012; and Kazempour et al., 2013), but not
much in research on biofuel supply chain.
The Cournot game, the Stackelberg game, and the Bertrand game can be combined to
model complicated game theoretic problems. For example, Assila et al. (2017), Caldentey and
Haugh (2017), and Ruiz-Hernández et al. (2017) studied the combined Cournot-Stackelberg
game to deal with game theoretic models with more than one leader, follower or both. Ma and
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Li (2014) and Zhang et al. (2015) studied the combined Stackelberg-Bertrand game to deal
with pricing game models with more than one leader, follower or both.

In this research, we study a biofuel supply chain where two farmers and a utility company
independently make their own decisions throughout three stages. At the first stage, the farmers
quote water prices to the utility company. In the second stage, the utility company allocates
water to the farmers, based on their price announcements. In the third stage, the farmers
produce crops and sell them at a corn market and a switchgrass market, competing against each
other. Our mathematical model consists of a Bertrand game and a Cournot game between the
two farmers in the first stage and the third stage, respectively, and a Stackelberg game between
the farmers and the utility company. Our model is formulated as a three-stage CournotStackelberg-Bertrand game.

18

3. MODEL DESIGN

3.1. Comprehensive Problem Description

This research models the equilibrium of a biofuel supply chain (BSC) with three stages of
the decision-making process, which consists of three entities (players): a downstream farmer
(𝐹𝑑 ), an upstream farmer (𝐹𝑢 ), and a utility company (𝑈0 ).

In this BSC, the two farmers are located in two discrete regions; the downstream side and
the upstream side of a hydroelectric reservoir. Each of the abovementioned farmers could be
regarded as a farmer union of small farmers in each region. Forming a union can bring them
benefits such as having a more advantageous position in contract negotiation with refineries,
avoiding unproductive competition with each other, and protecting themselves against large
corporates.

Both farmers produce corn and switchgrass and sell their crops at a corn market consisting
of corn-based refineries and at a switchgrass market consisting of switchgrass-based refineries.
So, both markets are duopolies. The farmers compete against each other in the two markets.
The downstream and upstream farmers both have identical technology, equipment, and
capability to cultivate corn and switchgrass. The outputs of the farmers are homogenous. Both
19

farmers make decisions to maximize their own profits, competing against each other at the corn
market and the switchgrass market. The farmers quote the water prices at which they want to
buy at the beginning of a season to secure the amount of water they will use during the season.

The utility company manages the reservoir, operates the hydropower dam, and sells water
to both farmers. The amount of water the utility company sells to the farmers is determined
based on the water prices quoted by the farmers. In addition to the revenue from the water sales
to the farmers, the utility company also earns revenue from selling hydroelectricity at an
electricity market. The utility company has a low market share and little power to influence the
electricity price at the market; the utility company is a price-taker.

20

Figure 1. The entire framework of the interactive decision-making in the model
(the numbers in parentheses are the order of decision-making in the BSC)

The structure of the BSC is depicted in Figure 1. The sequence of the decision process in
the BSC is as follows:

(0) Out of the BSC and before the game, the government announces subsidies to the
farmers (𝑠𝑑 , 𝑠𝑢 ).
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(1) In the first stage, the farmers decide water prices (𝑝𝑑 , 𝑝𝑢 ) and announce them to the
utility company for procurement. At this stage, they do not yet decide the land allocation to
corn and switchgrass.

(2) In the second stage, after observing the price announcement, the utility company
decides water quantities (𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 ) to allocate to the farmers. The company knows that they can
generate hydroelectricity using the water released to the downstream of the dam and sell the
electricity to an electricity market.

(3) In the third stage, after observing the water allocation, the farmers decide land
allocations (𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 , 𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ) for corn and switchgrass production in order to compete against
each other in the corn market and the switchgrass market.

The utility company decides the water allocations to the two farmers depending on the
water prices announced from the farmers. The water allocations are affected not only by the
water prices but also by the sale of hydroelectricity generated by water released to the
downstream. The amounts of water allocated affect the farmers’ land allocation for the crops,
since the two crops have different water requirements and different prices in the markets. At
the two markets, the prices of the products are determined by the total amounts of commodities
(corn and switchgrass) provided by the farmers and available at the markets.
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This study analyzes the interdependency of the decisions and models the decision process
as a three-stage Stackelberg game. At the first stage, the amount of water released to farmers
depends not only on their own quote of the water price, but also on the water price quoted by
the competitor. So, there is a Bertrand game between the downstream farmer and the upstream
farmer for water allocation. At the third stage, since the revenues from the sales of corn and
switchgrass by farmers are determined not only by their decisions on the crops’ production
amounts, but also by the market prices of the commodities, we have a Cournot game at both
the corn market and the switchgrass market. Since we have a sequence of decision-making
throughout the three stages, where decisions in a stage affect decisions in the following stages,
we have a leader-follower Stackelberg game.

In this game, the decisions at each stage affect the decisions of other stages in a cyclic
feedback structure. The farmers’ decisions on the water prices (𝑝𝑑 , 𝑝𝑢 ) in the first stage affect
the utility company’s decisions on water allocation (𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 ) in the second stage. The utility
company’s decisions affect the farmers’ decisions on land allocation (𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 , 𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ) in the
third stage. Then, the water allocation in the second stage and the land allocation in the third
stage affect the farmers’ decisions on water prices in the first stage. In this decision cycle,
players’ decisions at each stage are dependent on those in other stages.
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In the model, we assume that the farmers’ land sizes are big enough so that they can
consume any amount of water allocated by the utility company based on their quoted water
prices. If the farmers are small and the utility company has enough water to meet the demands
of the farmers, there will be no game between the farmers for water; in such as case only the
Cournot competition exists at the corn market and the switchgrass market.

Due to the societal benefits of cellulosic bioethanol, the government subsidizes the energy
crop (switchgrass) production rather than the food crop (corn) production in the BSC. Because
the government subsidies affect the decisions of the firms in the BSC, we consider the subsidies
in the model. In the model, the government is not a player in the game, but an entity that sets
the condition of the game environment before the game begins.

Farmers are willing to produce corn rather than switchgrass, since corn supply chains are
well developed, contrary to the only recently currently emerging switchgrass supply chains.
Since the government should consider not only energy security but also food security, the
amounts of the subsidies are determined to prevent the corn market and the switchgrass market
from disappearing or becoming monopolistic markets. We assume that the government decides
the amounts of the subsidies to induce the farmers to produce both corn and switchgrass
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because consumer surplus and social welfare under duopoly would be higher than those under
monopoly.

The decision variables and parameters are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
Table 1. Decision variables
Decision Variables

Unit

𝑝𝑑

Water price the downstream farmer offers to the utility company

$/gal

𝑝𝑢

Water price the upstream farmer offers to the utility company

$/gal

𝑤𝑑

Water quantity the utility company allocates to the downstream farmer

gal

𝑤𝑢

Water quantity the utility company allocates to the upstream farmer

gal

𝑞𝑑𝑐

Land area of the downstream farmer for corn production

ha

𝑞𝑑𝑠

Land area of the downstream farmer for switchgrass production

ha

𝑞𝑢𝑐

Land area of the upstream farmer for corn production

ha

𝑞𝑢𝑠

Land area of the upstream farmer for switchgrass production

ha

Table 2. Parameters

Parameters

Unit

𝑤

Water capacity of the utility company

gal

𝛼𝑐

Amount of corn grown in unit land

t/ha
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𝛼𝑠

Amount of switchgrass grown in unit land

𝛼𝑒

Amount of hydroelectricity generated by release of unit water

𝑝𝑒

Price of the hydroelectricity at an electricity market

𝑐𝑐

Cost of corn production

$/t

𝑐𝑠

Cost of switchgrass production

$/t

𝑐𝑤

Cost of processing water supply

$/gal2

𝛿𝑐

Water requirement per unit land for corn production

gal/ha

𝛿𝑠

Water requirement per unit land for switchgrass production

gal/ha

𝑎𝑐

Reservation price at a corn market

$/t

𝑏𝑐

Marginal price per unit quantity at a corn market

$/t 2

𝑎𝑠

Reservation price at a switchgrass market

$/t

𝑏𝑠

Marginal price per unit quantity at a switchgrass market

$/t 2

𝑃𝑐 (∙)

Inverse demand function at a corn market

$/t

𝑃𝑠 (∙)

Inverse demand function at a switchgrass market

$/t

t/ha
kWh/gal
$/kWh

𝑠𝑑

Subsidy to the downstream farmer for switchgrass production

$/ha

𝑠𝑢

Subsidy to the upstream farmer for switchgrass production

$/ha
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3.2. Mathematical Model

In this section, we introduce the objective functions, constraints, and decision variables of
the players in the three stages of the decision process in the BSC. The farmers are leaders in
the first stage and followers in the third stage: they decide water prices, 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑢 , in the first
stage, and land allocation for crop production, 𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 , 𝑞𝑢𝑐 , and 𝑞𝑢𝑠 , in the third stage. The utility
company is a follower and decides water allocation, 𝑤𝑑 and 𝑤𝑢 , in the second stage.
We find the equilibrium of the farmers’ decisions in the first stage and the third stage, and
the utility company’s decision in the second stage by the backward induction procedure using
their best response (BR) functions. First, we derive the best responses of the farmers through
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of their problems for the decision variables of the third
stage. Second, we derive the best response of the utility company through KKT conditions of
its problems for the decision variables of the second stage. Third, we derive leaders’ optimal
decisions through KKT conditions of their problems for the decision variables of the first stage.
In this section, the backward induction solution process is followed in this order:
(1) We derive the best responses of the farmers in the third stage.
(2) We derive the best responses of the utility company in the second stage.
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(3) We derive the optimal decision of the farmers in the first stage by using the utility
company’s best responses in the second stage and the farmers’ best responses in the third
stage.
(4) Then, we find the equilibrium of the farmers and the utility company by substituting
the optimal decisions in the first stage into the best responses in the second and third
stages.

3.2.1. Farmers’ decision on land use in the third stage

In this section, we introduce the objective functions of the downstream and upstream
farmers that maximize their own profits through their best decisions on land allocation,
(𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ) and (𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ) respectively. The water capacity constraints are also introduced. In this
third stage, the farmers make their best responses for land allocation based on the decision of
the utility company on water allocation (𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 ) in the second stage and each other’s
decisions on land allocation (𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 , 𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ).
All parameters in the model are strictly positive. However, water allocation (𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 )
from the second stage can be zero. We have four cases to consider based on the positivity of
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the water allocation in the third stage: Case [1] 𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0; Case [2] 𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0;
Case [3] 𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0; and Case [4] 𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0. The best responses for these cases of
this third stage subgame are derived below and summarized in Table 3 and the derivation is
presented in Appendix A. It is assumed that the parameter values meet the non-negativity
conditions of the land allocation (𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 , 𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ) and two shadow prices (𝜆1 , 𝜆4 ) shown in the
second column of Table 3.

3.2.1.1. Best response for Case [1] (𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0)

In this case neither the downstream farmer nor the upstream farmer produces any crop
(𝑞𝑑𝑐 = 𝑞𝑑𝑠 = 𝑞𝑢𝑐 = 𝑞𝑢𝑠 = 0), since the farmers cannot utilize water (𝑤𝑑 = 𝑤𝑢 = 0). They do
not make profit (𝜋𝑑 = 𝜋𝑢 = 0).

3.2.1.2. Best response for Case [2] (𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0)

(1) Formulation

For the downstream farmer, we have
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max
𝜋 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢𝑐 )]𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑞𝑢𝑠 )]𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐
𝑐 𝑠 𝑑

𝑞𝑑 ,𝑞𝑑

−𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑠𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑠 − 𝑤𝑑 𝑝𝑑

(1)

𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ≤ 𝑤𝑑

(𝜆1 )

water capacity constraint

(2)

𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ≥ 0

(𝜆2 , 𝜆3 )

non-negativity constraints

(3,4)

and, for the upstream farmer, we have

max 𝜋𝑢 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢𝑐 )]𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑞𝑢𝑠 )]𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐

𝑐 ,𝑞𝑠
𝑞𝑢
𝑢

−𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢 𝑞𝑢𝑠 − 𝑤𝑢 𝑝𝑢

(5)

𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 + 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ≤ 𝑤𝑢

(𝜆4 )

water capacity constraint

(6)

𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ≥ 0

(𝜆5 , 𝜆6 )

non-negativity constraints

(7,8)

In Equation (1) and Equation (5), the first two terms are the farmers’ revenues from the
corn market and the switchgrass market, respectively. The next two terms are the costs of crop
production. The last two terms are the government subsidy for the switchgrass production and
cost of water purchased from the utility company. In Equations (2) – (4) and (6) – (8), 𝜆s’ are
KKT multipliers, or the shadow prices, of the constraints.
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(2) KKT condition

Now, we use KKT conditions to derive the best responses of the downstream farmer and the
upstream farmer in the third stage. The KKT conditions of the problems are as follows:

For the downstream farmer,

ℒ1 = 𝜋𝑑 + 𝜆1 (𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ) + 𝜆2 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝜆3 𝑞𝑑𝑠
𝜕ℒ1
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕ℒ1
𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

(9)

= (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑞𝑢𝑐 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 = 0

(10)

= (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑞𝑢𝑠 + 𝑠𝑑 ) − 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑞𝑑𝑠 − 𝛿𝑠 𝜆1 + 𝜆3 = 0

(11)

0 ≤ 𝜆1 ⊥ [𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ] ≥ 0

(12)

0 ≤ 𝜆2 ⊥ [𝑞𝑑𝑐 ] ≥ 0

(13)

0 ≤ 𝜆3 ⊥ [𝑞𝑑𝑠 ] ≥ 0,

(14)

and, for the upstream farmer,

ℒ2 = 𝜋𝑢 + 𝜆4 (𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ) + 𝜆5 𝑞𝑢𝑐 + 𝜆6 𝑞𝑢𝑠
𝜕ℒ2
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕ℒ2
𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑢

(15)

= (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑞𝑑𝑐 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 𝜆4 + 𝜆5 = 0

(16)

= (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢 ) − 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑞𝑢𝑠 − 𝛿𝑠 𝜆4 + 𝜆6 = 0

(17)

0 ≤ 𝜆4 ⊥ [𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ] ≥ 0

(18)
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0 ≤ 𝜆5 ⊥ [𝑞𝑢𝑐 ] ≥ 0

(19)

0 ≤ 𝜆6 ⊥ [𝑞𝑢𝑠 ] ≥ 0

(20)

(3) Best response

Because the lands of the farmers are large, the farmers consume all the water allocated to
them by the utility company, and the water capacity constraints of the farmers are binding. So,
from the complementary slack conditions of the KKT conditions of the water capacity
constraints shown above, we have [𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ] = 0, [𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ] = 0, 𝜆1 ≥
0, and 𝜆4 ≥ 0.
The downstream and upstream farmers’ land allocations for both corn and switchgrass are
equal to or greater than zero (𝑞𝑑𝑐 > 0, 𝑞𝑑𝑠 > 0, 𝑞𝑢𝑐 > 0, 𝑞𝑢𝑠 > 0). So, we assume 𝜆2 = 0, 𝜆3 =
0, 𝜆5 = 0, and 𝜆6 = 0 . In summary, we have these conditions in Case [2]: 𝜆1 ≥ 0, 𝜆2 =
0, 𝜆3 = 0, 𝜆4 ≥ 0, 𝜆5 = 0, and 𝜆6 = 0.
These conditions are used to solve the KKT conditions, and the results are shown in Table
3.
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3.2.1.3. Best response for Case [3] 𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0

(1) Formulation

In this case, the downstream farmer does not produce any crop (𝑞𝑑𝑐 = 𝑞𝑑𝑠 = 0), since the
downstream farmer cannot utilize water (𝑤𝑑 = 0). Also, the downstream farmer does not
make profit (𝜋𝑑 = 0). In this case, the corn market and the switchgrass market are monopoly
markets of the upstream farmer without competition. The objective function and the constraints
of the upstream farmer are as follows:

max
𝜋𝑢 = (𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 + (𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢 𝑞𝑢𝑠 − 𝑤𝑢 𝑝𝑢
𝑐 𝑠

(5’)

𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 + 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ≤ 𝑤𝑢

(𝜆4 )

water capacity constraint

(6’)

𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ≥ 0

(𝜆5 , 𝜆6 )

non-negativity constraints

𝑞𝑢 ,𝑞𝑢

(7’,8’)

(2) KKT condition

Now, we use KKT conditions to derive the best responses of the upstream farmer in the third
stage. The KKT conditions of the problems are as follows:

ℒ2′ = 𝜋𝑢 + 𝜆4 (𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ) + 𝜆5 𝑞𝑢𝑐 + 𝜆6 𝑞𝑢𝑠
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(21)

𝜕ℒ2′
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕ℒ2′
𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑢

= (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 𝜆4 + 𝜆5 = 0

(22)

= (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢 ) − 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑞𝑢𝑠 − 𝛿𝑠 𝜆4 + 𝜆6 = 0

(23)

0 ≤ 𝜆4 ⊥ [𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ] ≥ 0

(24)

0 ≤ 𝜆5 ⊥ [𝑞𝑢𝑐 ] ≥ 0

(25)

0 ≤ 𝜆6 ⊥ [𝑞𝑢𝑠 ] ≥ 0

(26)

(3) Best response

Because the land of the upstream farmer is large, the upstream farmer consumes all the
water allocated by the utility company, and the water capacity constraint of the farmer is
binding. So, from the complementary slack conditions of the KKT conditions of the water
capacity constraint shown above, we have [𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑢𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ] = 0 and 𝜆4 ≥ 0.
The upstream farmer’s land allocations for both corn and switchgrass are equal to or
greater than zero (𝑞𝑢𝑐 > 0, 𝑞𝑢𝑠 > 0). So, we assume 𝜆5 = 0, and 𝜆6 = 0. In summary, we have
these conditions in Case [3]: 𝜆4 ≥ 0, 𝜆5 = 0, and 𝜆6 = 0.
These conditions are used to solve the KKT conditions, and the results are shown in Table
3.
34

3.2.1.4. Best response for Case [4] 𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0

(1) Formulation

In this case, the upstream farmer does not produce any crop (𝑞𝑢𝑐 = 𝑞𝑢𝑐 = 0), since the
farmer cannot utilize water (𝑤𝑢 = 0). Also, the upstream farmer does not make profit (𝜋𝑢 =
0). In this case, the corn market and the switchgrass market are monopoly markets of the
downstream farmer without competition. The objective function and the constraints of the
downstream farmer are as follows:

max
𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 ]𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ]𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑠𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑠 − 𝑤𝑑 𝑝𝑑
𝑐 𝑠

(1’)

𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ≤ 𝑤𝑑

(𝜆1 )

water capacity constraint

(2’)

𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ≥ 0

(𝜆2 , 𝜆3 )

non-negativity constraints

𝑞𝑑 ,𝑞𝑑

(3’,4’)

(2) KKT condition

Now, we use KKT conditions to derive the best responses of the downstream farmer in the
third stage. The KKT conditions of the problems are as follows:
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ℒ1′ = 𝜋𝑑 + 𝜆1 (𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ) + 𝜆2 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝜆3 𝑞𝑑𝑠

(27)

𝜕ℒ1′

= (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 = 0

(28)

𝜕ℒ1′

= (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠𝑑 ) − 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑞𝑑𝑠 − 𝛿𝑠 𝜆1 + 𝜆3 = 0

(29)

𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

0 ≤ 𝜆1 ⊥ [𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ] ≥ 0

(30)

0 ≤ 𝜆2 ⊥ [𝑞𝑑𝑐 ] ≥ 0

(31)

0 ≤ 𝜆3 ⊥ [𝑞𝑑𝑠 ] ≥ 0

(32)

(3) Best response

Because the land of the downstream farmer is large, the downstream farmer consumes all
the water allocated by the utility company, and the water capacity constraint of the farmer is
binding. So, from the complementary slack conditions of the KKT conditions of the water
capacity constraint shown above, we have [𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝑞𝑑𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ] = 0 and 𝜆1 ≥ 0.
The downstream farmer’s land allocations for both corn and switchgrass are equal to or
greater than zero (𝑞𝑑𝑐 > 0, 𝑞𝑑𝑠 > 0). So, we assume 𝜆2 = 0, and 𝜆3 = 0. In summary, we have
these conditions in case [4]: 𝜆1 ≥ 0, 𝜆2 = 0, and 𝜆3 = 0. These conditions are used to solve
the KKT conditions, and the results are shown in Table 3.
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3.2.1.3. Solution

From the subgame, we obtain the farmers’ best response in the third stage towards the
utility company’s decision in the second stage. Cases with the conditions of water allocation,
and the farmers’ best responses and profits are shown in Table 3. The calculation and the proof
of Table 3 are shown in Appendix A.

Table 3. Cases with conditions of water allocation, and the farmers’ best responses and profits in the third stage
Best Response and Profits of the Farmers in the Third Stage
Case

Condition

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 , (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 , (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 , (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 , 𝜋𝑑 , 𝜋𝑢
(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 = 0
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 = 0

[1]

𝑤𝑑 = 0
𝑤𝑢 = 0

(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 = 0
(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 = 0
𝜋𝑑 = 0
𝜋𝑢 = 0

𝑤𝑑 > 0

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑑 −𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

≥0

𝑤𝑢 > 0
[2]

𝜆1 > 0

(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 =

𝜆2 = 0
𝜆3 = 0
𝜆4 > 0

(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 =

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑑 +𝛿𝑐 2 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

≥0

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑢 −𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (−𝑠𝑑 +2𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
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≥0

𝜆5 = 0
𝜆6 = 0

(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 =

𝜆1 =

𝜆4 =

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢 +𝛿𝑐 2 (−𝑠𝑑 +2𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

≥0

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 (2𝑤𝑑 +𝑤𝑢 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑤𝑑 +2𝑤𝑢 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 }](𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅
𝜋𝑑 = +[𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 }](𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + 𝑠𝑑 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑑 𝑝𝑑
𝜋𝑢 = [𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 }](𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅
𝜋𝑑 = +[𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 }](𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + 𝑠𝑢 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑢 𝑝𝑢

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 = 0
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 = 0
(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑢 −𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

≥0

𝑤𝑑 = 0
𝑤𝑢 > 0
[3]

(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 =

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢 +𝛿𝑐 2 𝑠𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

𝜆4 > 0
𝜆5 = 0
𝜆6 = 0

𝜆4 =

≥0

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤𝑢 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

>0

𝜋𝑑 = 0
𝜋𝑢 = [𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 ](𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + [𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 ](𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅
𝜋𝑑 = +𝑠𝑢 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑢 𝑝𝑢

𝑤𝑑 > 0

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑑 −𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

≥0

𝑤𝑢 = 0
[4]

𝜆1 > 0

(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 =

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑑 +𝛿𝑐 2 𝑠𝑑

𝜆2 = 0
𝜆3 = 0

2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 = 0
(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 = 0
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≥0

>0

>0

𝜆1 =

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤𝑑 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

>0

𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 ](𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + [𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 ](𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅
𝜋𝑑 = +𝑠𝑑 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑑 𝑝𝑑
𝜋𝑢 = 0

In Case [2], the best responses of the farmers’ land use are feasible only when the
government subsidies meet following conditions.

2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ≥

𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) − 3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑑
𝛿𝑐 2

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑑
2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ≤
𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
−𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢 ≥

𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) − 3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢
𝛿𝑐 2

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑢
−𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢 ≤
𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 (2𝑤𝑑 + 𝑤𝑢 ) − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
𝑠𝑑 >
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
𝑠𝑢 >

𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑤𝑑 + 2𝑤𝑢 ) − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠

In Case [3], the best responses of the farmers’ land use are feasible only when the
government subsidies meet following conditions.
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𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑢
𝑠𝑢 ≤
𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
𝑠𝑢 ≥

𝑠𝑢 >

𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢
𝛿𝑐 2

2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤𝑢 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠

In Case [4], the best responses of the farmers’ land use are feasible only when the
government subsidies meet following conditions.
𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑑
𝑠𝑑 ≤
𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
𝑠𝑑 ≥

𝑠𝑑 >

𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑑
𝛿𝑐 2

2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤𝑑 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠

3.2.1.4. Analysis

We analyze the effect of the utility company’s water allocation (𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 ) in the second
stage on the farmers’ land allocation (𝑞𝑑𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑𝑠 , 𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ) in the third stage. The best response of
the farmers could be derived from the KKT conditions of their profit functions. In Case [1],
Case [3], and Case [4], the land allocation is determined as a given value and not as a function
of water allocation (𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 ). So, the land allocation is not affected by the water allocation in
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case [1], [3], and [4], where the company either allocates all the water to a single farmer or
does not allocate water to any farmer. Hence, we could analyze Case [2] with the effect of the
water allocation.

Corollary 1. If the farmers’ land capacity is enough to utilize all the water they purchase and
the utility company allocates water to both farmers in Case [2] (𝑤𝑑 ≥ 0, 𝑤𝑢 ≥ 0) , the
following holds for the effect of the utility company’s decision in the second stage on the
farmers’ decisions in the third stage:

(1)

(3)

𝑐
)
𝜕(𝑞𝑑

𝜕(𝑤𝑑

𝐵𝑅

)𝐵𝑅

𝑐
)
𝜕(𝑞𝑑

𝐵𝑅

𝜕(𝑤𝑢 )𝐵𝑅

=

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2
𝛿𝑠
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2
𝛿𝑐
𝑠
)
𝜕(𝑞𝑑

𝜕(𝑞 𝑠 )

𝐵𝑅

∙ 𝜕(𝑤𝑑 )𝐵𝑅 > 0 (2)
𝑑

𝐵𝑅

= 𝜕(𝑤

𝐵𝑅
𝑢)

=0

(4)

𝑐 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢
𝜕(𝑤𝑑 )𝐵𝑅

𝑐 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢
𝜕(𝑤𝑢 )𝐵𝑅

𝜕(𝑞 𝑠 )𝐵𝑅

= 𝜕(𝑤𝑢 )𝐵𝑅 = 0
𝑑

=

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2
𝛿𝑠
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2
𝛿𝑐

𝜕(𝑞 𝑠 )𝐵𝑅

∙ 𝜕(𝑤𝑢 )𝐵𝑅 > 0
𝑢

Proof is shown in Appendix B.

Corollary 1 reveals the reaction of the farmers to the utility company’s decision, as
(𝑤𝑑 )𝐵𝑅 and (𝑤𝑢 )𝐵𝑅 . (2,3) The land allocation of the downstream farmer is not directly
affected by the water allocation to the upstream farmer, and vice versa. (1,4) The farmers would
use more land to produce both corn and switchgrass in case of higher water allocation to them.
The ratio of marginal land allocation between corn and switchgrass is determined by
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𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2

and

𝛿𝑠

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2
𝛿𝑐

for both farmers. The meaning of the coefficients is division of the marginal

crop market price per unit land use for the corresponding crop (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 and 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 ) by the water
requirement of the crop per unit land (𝛿𝑠 and 𝛿𝑐 ), of the switchgrass and the corn respectively.

3.2.2. Utility company’s decision on water allocation in the second stage

Here, we introduce the objective function of the utility company that maximizes its profit
through its best decisions on water allocation (𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 ) in the second stage. The constraints of
water capacity and non-negativity of the decision variables used in the second stage are also
introduced. In the second stage, the company makes its best response for water allocation
(𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 ), based on the decision of the farmers in the first stage.

3.2.2.1. Formulation

The objective function and the constraints of the utility company in the second stage are shown
as follows:

max 𝜋ℎ = 𝑝𝑑 𝒘𝒅 + 𝑝𝑢 𝒘𝒖 − 𝑐𝑤 [(𝒘𝒅 )2 + (𝒘𝒖 )2 ] + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 𝒘𝒅

𝒘𝒅 ,𝒘𝒖

𝒘𝒅 + 𝒘𝒖 ≤ 𝑤

(𝜆7 )

water capacity constraint
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(33)

(34)

𝒘𝒅 , 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(𝜆8 , 𝜆9 )

non-negativity constraints

(35,36)

In Equation (33), the first two terms are revenue from sale of water to the downstream
farmer and the upstream farmer, respectively. The third term is cost of crop production, and
the last term is revenue from the sale of hydroelectricity generated by water release from the
dam, at an electricity market. In equations (34) – (36), 𝜆s are KKT multipliers or the shadow
price of the constraints.

3.2.2.2. KKT Conditions

Best responses of the utility company in the second stage could be derived by using the
KKT conditions of the utility company’s problem as follows:

ℒ3 = 𝜋ℎ + 𝜆7 (𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ) + 𝜆8 𝒘𝒅 + 𝜆9 𝒘𝒖

𝜕ℒ3
𝜕𝒘𝒅

𝜕ℒ3
𝜕𝒘𝒖

(37)

= 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 = 0

(38)

= 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆9 = 0

(39)

0 ≤ 𝜆7 ⊥ [𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ] ≥ 0

(40)

0 ≤ 𝜆8 ⊥ [𝒘𝒅 ] ≥ 0

(41)
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0 ≤ 𝜆9 ⊥ [𝒘𝒖 ] ≥ 0

(42)

3.2.2.3. Solution

From the subgame, we obtain four domains, as shown in Figure 2 and Table 4, where the
best response (BR) function of the company exists with five borders including x-axis and yaxis. The derivation of the best responses and the border lines are shown in Appendix B.

Figure 2. Domains of the Nash equilibria for the utility company’s best response
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Table 4. Best responses of the utility company and their conditions in the second stage
Domain

[1]

[2]

𝜆7 , 𝜆8 , 𝜆9

Conditions

𝜆7 = 0

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝜆8 = 0

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 ≥ 0

𝜆9 = 0

𝑝𝑢 ≥ 0

𝜆7 > 0

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝜆8 = 0

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝜆9 = 0

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝜆7 > 0
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[3]

Best Responses of the Utility

KKT Multiplier

Company (𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 , 𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅 )

(𝜆7 , 𝜆8 , 𝜆9 )

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒
>0
2𝑐𝑤
𝑝𝑢
=
>0
2𝑐𝑤

𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 =
𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 + 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤
4𝑐𝑤
−𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 + 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤
=
4𝑐𝑤

−

𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 =
𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅

𝜆7 =

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤
2

𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 = 0

𝜆7 = 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 < −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅

𝜆8 = −𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 > 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 = 𝑤 > 0

𝜆7 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅 = 0

𝜆9 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

𝜆8 > 0

=𝑤>0

Profit of the Utility Company (𝜋ℎ )

𝑝𝑑 2 + 𝑝𝑢 2 + 2𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 𝑝𝑑 + (𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 )2
4𝑐𝑤

𝑝𝑑 2 + 𝑝𝑢 2 + 2𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 (𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑢 ) − 2𝑝𝑑 𝑝𝑢 + 4𝑐𝑤 𝑤(𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 + 𝑐𝑤 𝑤) + (𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 )2
8𝑐𝑤

𝑤𝑝𝑢 − 𝑐𝑤 𝑤 2

𝜆9 = 0
𝜆7 > 0
[4]

𝜆8 = 0
𝜆9 > 0

•

Domain [1] and Domain [2] result in Case [2] (𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0) in the third stage.

•

Domain [3] results in Case [3] (𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0) in the third stage.

•

Domain [4] results in Case [4] (𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0) in the third stage.

•

All the parameters used in Table 4 are strong positive.

•

The calculation and the proof of Table 4 are shown in Appendix D.
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𝑤𝑝𝑑 − 𝑐𝑤 𝑤 2

Domain [1] result in Case [2] of the best responses of the farmers in the third stage under
the conditions of 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤. In this domain, the utility company utilizes its
entire water capacity only if the sum of the prices per unit water from the farmers (𝑝𝑑 , 𝑝𝑢 ) and
the revenue from sale of hydroelectricity per unit water (𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 ) is equal to the marginal cost of
supplying all the water to a single farmer (2𝑐𝑤 𝑤) . In other words, the utility company
completely utilizes its entire water to allocate to the farmers under the condition 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +
𝑝𝑢 = 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤. Otherwise, when the sum of the prices and the revenue is less than the marginal
cost under a condition of 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 < 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 , and the utility company does not
completely allocate all of its water to the farmers. The farmers receive as much water as they
want without competition against each other in the second stage. This case implies that the
farmers do not compete on water price under a game in the first stage.

Domain [2] can results in a case among Case [2], Case [3], and Case [4] of the best
responses of the farmers in the third stage under the conditions of 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 ,
𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑢 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 , and 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 . In Domain [2], the downstream
farmer and the upstream farmer would produce both crops (𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑞𝑑𝑠 ≥ 0, 𝑞𝑢𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢𝑠 ≥ 0) in the
third stage, since the utility company allocates water to both farmers (𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 > 0, 𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅 > 0) in
the second stage.
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Domains [3] and [4] result in cases [3] and [4] respectively of the best responses of the
farmers in the third stage. In Domain [3], the downstream farmer cannot cultivate any crop
(𝑞𝑑𝑐 = 𝑞𝑑𝑠 = 0) to make profit (𝜋𝑑 = 0) in the third stage, since the utility company does not
allocate water to the downstream farmer (𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 = 0, 𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅 = 𝑤) under the condition of 𝑝𝑑 −
𝑝𝑢 < −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 , in the second stage. On the other hand, in Domain [4], the upstream
farmer cannot cultivate any crop (𝑞𝑢𝑐 = 𝑞𝑢𝑠 = 0) to make profit (𝜋𝑢 = 0) in the third stage,
since the utility company does not allocate water to the upstream farmer (𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 = 𝑤, 𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅 = 0)
under the condition of 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 in the second stage.

Among all possible solutions of the above problem, we are interested only in the cases
where additional water capacity of the dam increases the profit of the utility company, i.e.,
when 𝜆7 > 0. In this case, the water capacity constraint of the utility company becomes binding.
Domains [2], [3], and [4] belong to this case whereas Domain [1] does not belong to this case.
If the water capacity constraint is not binding, with there being enough water to meet the
demand, the price competition between the farmers does not occur.

In domains [2], [3], and [4], we could analyze the result of a Bertrand game between the
downstream farmers and the upstream farmers toward price-bidding for water allocation. In
Domain [1], the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer share the water from the utility
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company after the competitive bidding. On the other hand, in domains [3] and [4], one of the
farmers takes all the water from the utility company after winning the bidding against the other
farmer. The upstream farmer and the downstream farmer are the winner in Domain [3] and
Domain [4], respectively.

3.2.2.4. Analysis

We analyze the effect of the farmers’ decision regarding water prices (𝑝𝑑 , 𝑝𝑢 ) in the first
stage on the utility company’s water allocation (𝑤𝑑 , 𝑤𝑢 ) in the second stage. The best response
of the company could be derived from the KKT conditions. In domains [3] and [4], the water
allocation to each farmer is 𝑤 or 0, and not a function of the water prices from the farmers.
The water allocation is not affected by the water prices in domains [3] and [4], where the utility
company allocates all the water to only one of the farmers. Hence, we analyze Domain [2] with
the effect of the water price from the farmers.
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Corollary 2. If the farmers’ land capacity is enough to utilize the water that they purchase from
the utility company in Domain [2], the following holds for the effect of the farmers’ decisions
in the first stage on the utility company’s decision in the second stage:

(1)

𝜕𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑑

=−

𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑤𝑢

𝜕𝑝𝑑

>0

(2)

𝜕𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑢

=−

𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑤𝑢

𝜕𝑝𝑢

<0

Proof is shown in Appendix D.

Corollary 2 reveals the reaction of the utility company, 𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 and 𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅 , in the second stage
to the farmers’ decision, 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑢 , in the first stage. The company would allocate more water
to a farmer when that farmer is offering a higher price. Consequently, announcement of a higher
price offer by one farmer decreases the water allocation to each other.

3.2.3. Farmers’ decision on bidding water price in the first stage

In this subsection, we introduce the objective functions of the downstream farmer and the
upstream farmer that maximize their own profits through their best decisions on the water price
(𝑝𝑑 ) and (𝑝𝑢 ) respectively, in the first stage. Non-negativity constraints of the decision
variables used in the first stage are also introduced.
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We also find equilibrium of the supply chain’s decision through the best decision of the
farmers in the first stage, the best response of the utility company in the second stage, and the
best responses of the farmers in the third stage.

In the first stage, the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer compete in water price
under a Bertrand game. After the bidding competition, the farmers share the water from the
utility company or one of the farmers takes all the water after winning the bidding. Both farmers
make their decisions on water price in the belief that the corn market and the switchgrass market
are duopolistic rather than monopolistic, since each farmer believes that the other may want to
sell both corn and switchgrass at each market. After the farmers announce their water prices to
the utility company in the first stage, the company decides the water allocation. In the pricebidding competition, the result shows that the farmers share water (Domain [1] and Domain [2]
of the second stage), the downstream farmer is a winner of the bidding and takes all the water
(Domain [3] of the second stage) or the upstream farmer is a winner of the bidding and takes
all the water (Domain [4] of the second stage).

3.2.3.1. Formulation
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In the first stage, the farmers make their best decisions for water prices (𝑝𝑑 , 𝑝𝑢 ) by using
the best responses of the utility company in the second stage and of the farmers in the third
stage. The objective function and the constraint of the farmers in the first stage are formulated
as follows:

For the downstream farmer,

max 𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 }]𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 +
𝒑𝒅

aaaaaaaaa(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 }]𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + 𝑠𝑑 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑑 𝐵𝑅 𝒑𝒅
𝒑𝒅 ≥ 0

(𝜆10 )

non-negativity constraint

(43)
(44)

and, for the upstream farmer,

max 𝜋𝑢 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 }]𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 +
𝒑𝒖

aaaaaaaaa(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 }]𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + 𝑠𝑢 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑢 𝐵𝑅 𝒑𝒖
𝒑𝒖 ≥ 0

(𝜆11 )

non-negativity constraint

(45)
(46)

Then, we reformulate the above problems in each scenario into their KKT conditions to
derive the best responses of the players in the problems of the downstream farmer and the
upstream farmer in the third stage.
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3.2.3.2. KKT Conditions

Best responses of the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer in the third stage could
be derived by using the KKT conditions of its problems as follows:

For the downstream farmer’s problem,

ℒ4 = 𝜋𝑑 + 𝜆10 𝑝𝑑

𝜕ℒ4
𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝜕ℒ5
𝜕𝑝𝑢

(47)

𝜕𝑞 𝑐

𝜕𝑞 𝑐

𝜕𝑞 𝑐

𝑑

𝑑

𝑑

𝜕ℒ

= [𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢𝑐 )] 𝜕𝑝𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝜕𝑝𝑑 + 𝜕𝑝𝑢 ) 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + [𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝜕𝑝5 =
= 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑞𝑢𝑠 )]

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑝𝑑

− 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑝𝑑

+

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑝𝑑

) 𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑠𝑑

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑝𝑑

− 𝑤𝑑 −

𝑢

𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝜕𝑝𝑑

𝑝𝑑 + 𝜆10 = 0

(48)

0 ≤ 𝜆10 ⊥ [𝑝𝑑 ] ≥ 0

(49)

and, for the upstream farmer’s problem,

ℒ5 = 𝜋𝑢 + 𝜆11 𝑝𝑢

𝜕ℒ5
𝜕𝑝𝑢
𝜕ℒ5
𝜕𝑝𝑢

(50)

𝜕𝑞 𝑐

𝜕𝑞 𝑐

𝜕𝑞 𝑐

𝑢

𝑢

𝑢

𝜕ℒ

= [𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢𝑐 )] 𝜕𝑝𝑢 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝜕𝑝𝑑 + 𝜕𝑝𝑢 ) 𝑞𝑢𝑐 + [𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝜕𝑝5 =
𝜕𝑞 𝑠

𝜕𝑞 𝑠

𝜕𝑞 𝑠

𝜕𝑞 𝑠

𝑢

𝑢

𝑢

𝑢

𝑢

𝜕𝑤

= 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑞𝑢𝑠 )] 𝜕𝑝𝑢 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝜕𝑝𝑑 + 𝜕𝑝𝑢) 𝑞𝑢𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢 𝜕𝑝𝑢 − 𝑤𝑢 − 𝜕𝑝 𝑢 𝑝𝑢 + 𝜆11 = 0

0 ≤ 𝜆11 ⊥ [𝑝𝑢 ] ≥ 0

𝑢

(51)

(52)
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From the above problems converted to their KKT conditions, we could find Nash
equilibrium of the Cournot competition game between the downstream farmer and the upstream
farmer by putting their KKT conditions, equations (48), (49), (51), and (52), together.

[(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢𝑐 )]
𝑤𝑑 −

𝜕𝑤𝑑 𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑑

𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑝𝑑

𝜕𝑞 𝑠

+ [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 𝑠𝑑 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑞𝑢𝑠 )] 𝜕𝑝𝑑 −
𝑑

𝑝𝑑 + 𝜆10 = 0

(53)

𝜆10 [𝑝𝑑 ] = 0

(54)

𝑝𝑑 ≥ 0

(55)

[(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢𝑐 )]

𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑝𝑢

𝜕𝑞 𝑠

+ [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 𝑠𝑢 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 + 𝑞𝑢𝑠 )] 𝜕𝑝𝑢 −
𝑢

𝜕𝑤

𝑤𝑢 − 𝜕𝑝 𝑢 𝑝𝑢 + 𝜆11 = 0

(56)

𝜆11 [𝑝𝒖 ] = 0

(57)

𝑝𝑢 ≥ 0

(58)

𝑢

The downstream and upstream farmers’ water price bids to the utility company are greater
than zero (𝑝𝑑 > 0, 𝑝𝑢 > 0), since the utility company does not sell its water at a non-positive
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price. So, we assume that Equation (55) and Equation (58) are not binding, and 𝜆10 =
0 and 𝜆11 = 0.

3.2.3.3. Solution

The Nash equilibrium of the farmers’ decisions in the first stage could be derived from the
KKT conditions.

Proposition 1. Through the farmers’ best responses in the third stage and the utility company’s
best response in the second stage, Nash equilibrium of the decisions of the farmers in the first
stage is as follows:

(1) 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 = 𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 +

2𝐵𝑑 +𝐵𝑢 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒

(2) 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 = 𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 +

𝐵𝑑 +2𝐵𝑢 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒

3

3

, where

𝐴=

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤

𝐵𝑑 =

,

(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

,
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and 𝐵𝑢 =

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

.

The calculation and the proof of deriving the Nash equilibrium for Proposition 1 are shown in
Appendix E.

3.2.4. Nash equilibrium of the farmers’ and the utility company’s decisions in the BSC

We derive the equilibria of the farmers’ and the utility company’s decisions by substituting
the best responses.

After the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer decide their water prices, the utility
company makes a decision on water allocation based on the prices. The farmers’ best decisions
in the first stage result in one of the four domains in the second stage: Domain [1], Domain [2],
Domain [3], and Domain [4]. Among the four domains, we do not consider Domain [1], since
this domain does not generate a competitive game in water prices between the farmers.

Domain [2] happens in the second stage only if the farmers’ decisions on water prices meet
the following Condition [2] which consists of three sub-conditions derived in the second stage:

Condition [2]:
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𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 > 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

(2-1)

𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 − 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

(2-2)

𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 − 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

(2-3)

In Condition [2], sub-condition (2-1) presents that the utility company utilizes its entire
water capacity and does not leave over its water since the revenue per unit water is greater than
the marginal cost of supplying all the water. Moreover, sub-condition (2-2) and sub-condition
(2-3) present that the utility company allocates its water to both downstream farmer and
upstream farmer since the water prices from the farmers do not have significant difference in
the second stage.

Domain [3] happens in the second stage only if the farmers’ decisions on water prices meet
the following Condition [3] derived in the second stage:

Condition [3] 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 − 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 < −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

Condition [2] presents that the utility company allocates all the water to the upstream
farmer since the water price from the upstream farmer is significantly higher than that from the
downstream farmer. So, the upstream farmer is a winner who takes all the water from the utility
company in the price-bidding for water allocation in the second stage.
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Domain [4] happens in the second stage only if the farmers’ decisions on water prices meet
the following Condition [4] derived in the second stage:

Condition [4] 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 − 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 > 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

Condition [4] presents that the utility company allocates all the water to the downstream
farmer since the water price from the downstream farmer is significantly higher than that from
the upstream farmer. So, the downstream farmer is a winner who takes all the water from the
utility company in the price-bidding for water allocation in the second stage.

Proposition 2-1. When 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 and 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 meet Condition [2] of Domain [2], Nash equilibrium
of the decisions of the utility company in the second stage and the farmers in the third stage,
and their profits are as follows:

(1) Best decisions of the utility company in the second stage:

(𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸1 =

𝐵𝑑 −𝐵𝑢 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤

(𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸1 =

−𝐵𝑑 +𝐵𝑢 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤

12𝑐𝑤

12𝑐𝑤

=

(𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )

=

12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0

(−𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )−𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

(2) Best decisions of the farmers in the third stage:
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>0

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 =

(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 =

(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 =

(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 =

4𝑐𝑤 [𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐−𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )]+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝐵𝑑 −𝐵𝑢 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)−4𝑐𝑤 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

−4𝑐𝑤 [𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )]+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝐵𝑑 −𝐵𝑢 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)+4𝑐𝑤 𝛿𝑐 2 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0

>0

4𝑐𝑤 [𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )]+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (−𝐵𝑑 +𝐵𝑢 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒+6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)+4𝑐𝑤 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 −2𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

−4𝑐𝑤 [𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )]+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (−𝐵𝑑 +𝐵𝑢 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒+6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)−4𝑐𝑤 𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑠𝑑 −2𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0

>0

where

𝐴=

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤

𝐵𝑑 =

and 𝐵𝑢 =

,

(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

,

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢

.

(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

(3) Profit of the farmers and the utility company:

𝜋𝑑 [1] = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 }]𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 }]𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑠𝑑 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸1 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸

𝜋𝑑 [1] = [(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 }](𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 }](𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑠𝑑 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸1 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸

𝜋𝑢 [1] = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 }]𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 }]𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑠𝑢 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑤𝑢 𝑁𝐸1 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸
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𝜋𝑢 [1] = [(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 }](𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 }](𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑠𝑢 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑤𝑢 𝑁𝐸1 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸

𝜋ℎ [1] = (𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 )𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 𝑤𝑢 𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑐𝑤 [(𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸1 )2 + (𝑤𝑢 𝑁𝐸1 )2 ]

The calculation and the proof of deriving the Nash equilibrium for Proposition 1-1 are shown
in Appendix F.1.

Proposition 2-2. When 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 and 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 meet Condition [3] of Domain [3], Nash equilibrium
of the decisions of the utility company in the second stage and the farmers in the third stage,
and their profits are as follows:

(1) Best decisions of the utility company in the second stage:

(𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸2 = 0

(𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸2 = 𝑤 > 0

(2) Best decisions of the farmers in the third stage:

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 = 0
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 = 0

59

(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 =

(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )
−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 2 𝑠𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

>0

>0

(3) Profit of the farmers and the utility company:
𝜋𝑑 [2] = 0
𝜋𝑢 [2] = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 ]𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 ]𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 + 𝑠𝑢 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 − 𝑤𝑢 𝑁𝐸2 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸

𝜋𝑢 [2] = [(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 ](𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 + [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 ](𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 + 𝑠𝑢 (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 − 𝑤𝑢 𝑁𝐸2 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸

𝜋ℎ [2] = 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 𝑤 − 𝑐𝑤 𝑤 2

where

𝐵𝑑 =

and 𝐵𝑢 =

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

,

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢

.

(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

The calculation and the proof of deriving the Nash equilibrium for Proposition 1-2 are shown
in Appendix F.2.
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Proposition 2-3. When 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 and 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 meet Condition [4] of Domain [4], Nash equilibrium
of the decisions of the utility company in the second stage and the farmers in the third stage,
and their profits are as follows:

(1) Best decisions of the utility company in the second stage:

(𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸3 = 𝑤 > 0

(𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0

(2) Best decisions of the farmers in the third stage:

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 =

(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )
−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 2 𝑠𝑑
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

>0

>0

(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0

(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0

(3) Profit of the farmers and the utility company:

𝜋𝑑 [3] = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 ]𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 ]𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 + 𝑠𝑑 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 − 𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸3 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸
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𝜋𝑑 [3] = [(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 ](𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 + [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 ](𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 + 𝑠𝑑 (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 − 𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸3 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸

𝜋𝑢 [3] = 0

𝜋ℎ [3] = (𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 )𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸3 − 𝑐𝑤 (𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸3 )2

𝜋ℎ [3] = (𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 )𝑤 − 𝑐𝑤 𝑤 2
, where
𝐵𝑑 =

and 𝐵𝑢 =

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑

,

(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

.

The calculation and the proof of deriving the Nash equilibrium for Proposition 1-3 are shown
in Appendix F.3.

3.2.3.3. Analysis

Depending on the government subsidy, the Nash equilibrium of the water prices (𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 ,
𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 ) can meet one of Condition [2], Condition [3], and Condition [4] in the first stage. Then,
based on the satisfied condition, the Nash equilibrium of the water allocation (𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸 , 𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸 ) is
determined among Domain [2], Domain [3], and Domain [4] in the second stage. Then, based
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on the determined domain of the water allocation, the Nash equilibrium of the land uses is
determined among Case [2], Case [3], and Case [4] in the third stage. In other words, when the
Nash equilibrium of the water prices meets Conditions [2], the Nash equilibrium of the water
allocation corresponds to Domain [2] and the Nash equilibrium of the land uses corresponds to
Case [2], Case [3], or Case [4]. When the Nash equilibrium of the water prices meets Conditions
[3], the Nash equilibrium of the water allocation corresponds to Domain [3] and the Nash
equilibrium of the land uses corresponds to Case [3]. When the Nash equilibrium of the water
prices meets Conditions [4], the Nash equilibrium of the water allocation corresponds to
Domain [4] and the Nash equilibrium of the land uses corresponds to Case [4].

In Chapter 4, we use the results in this chapter for a policy analysis to study the effect of
the government subsidy on the decisions and outputs of the BSC. In the policy analysis, we
consider that the Nash equilibrium of the water prices (𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 , 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 ) meets Condition [2] of
Domain [2] since this case is the most representative case in our research. In this case,
depending on the government subsidy, the downstream and upstream farmers may produce both
corn and switchgrass after both farmers receive water from the utility company.
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4. POLICY ANALYSIS

In Chapter 3, we presented mathematical models of the BSC, where two farmers purchase
water from a utility company, produce two kinds of biomass, corn and switchgrass, and sell the
crops at a corn market and a switchgrass market. We derived the best decisions of the farmers
and the utility company at each stage and found the Nash equilibrium of the BSC.

In this chapter, we analyze the effect of the government subsidy on the BSC, with the Nash
equilibrium of the farmers’ and the utility company’s decisions (𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 , 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 , 𝑤𝑑 𝑁𝐸 ,
𝑤𝑢 𝑁𝐸 , (𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸 , (𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸 , (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸 , (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸 ) which meets Condition [2] of Domain [2]. The
government subsidy affects the decisions and profits of the downstream farmers, the upstream
farmers and the utility company (𝜋𝑑 , 𝜋𝑢 , and 𝜋ℎ ), the producer surplus (𝑃𝑆𝜋 ), the consumer
surplus (CS) in a corn market (𝐶𝑆𝑐 ) and a switchgrass market (𝐶𝑆𝑠 ), and total social welfare
(𝑆𝑊) in the BSC. Producer surplus is the difference between the price the producers are willing
to supply their product for and the actual price of the product at a market. Consumer surplus is
the difference between the price consumers are willing to pay for a product and the actual price
of the product at a market. At a market with a linear inverse demand function, 𝑃(𝑄) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄,
where Q is the total quantity of the product sold at the market, producer surplus is the sum of
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the profits of the producers and consumer surplus can be obtained by

𝑏𝑄 2
2

. Government

expenditure (S𝑔𝑜𝑣 ) is the sum of the subsidies provided to the two farmers and is 𝑠𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑠𝑢 𝑞𝑢𝑐 .
In a market analysis, economic welfare (social welfare) at an equilibrium is the sum of producer
surplus and consumer surplus. In our model, we estimate economic performance of the subsidy
policy through subtracting the government expenditure on the subsidy from the social welfare.

𝑃𝑆𝜋 = 𝜋𝑑 + 𝜋𝑢 + 𝜋ℎ

𝐶𝑆𝑐 =

𝐶𝑆𝑠 =

𝑐
𝑐 )2
𝑏𝑐 (𝑞𝑑
+𝑞𝑢

2

𝑠
𝑠 )2
𝑏𝑠 (𝑞𝑑
+𝑞𝑢

2

S𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑠𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑐 + 𝑠𝑢 𝑞𝑢𝑐

: Producer surplus in the BSC

: Consumer surplus at a corn market in the BSC

: Consumer surplus at a switchgrass market in the BSC

: Government expenditure on the subsidy

𝑆𝑊 = 𝑃𝑆𝜋 + 𝐶𝑆𝑐 + 𝐶𝑆𝑠 : Social welfare in the BSC

∆𝑆𝑊 = 𝑆𝑊 − S𝑔𝑜𝑣

: Social welfare subtracted by the government expenditure

In this research, we study two forms of subsidy policy to the two farmers: [1] Different
amounts of subsidies per unit output quantity to the farmers (subsidy discrimination), [2] Equal
amounts of subsidies per unit output quantity to the farmers (subsidy equalization). Subsidy
equalization is a special case of subsidy discrimination.

65

Furthermore, we conduct a parametric analysis for the two forms of the subsidy policy by
using realistic parameters from literature. The effect of the subsidy amount on the profits of the
players and the social welfare subtracted by the government expenditure of the BSC is analyzed.
We analyze efficiencies of the two subsidy forms under the same budget limit. The values used
in the parameter analysis are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Parameters values from literature reviews

Value

Unit

Source

𝑝𝑒

0.010

$/kWh

Uria-Martinez et al (2018)

𝑐𝑤

3.5 × 10−10

$/gal2

Wichelns (2010)

𝛼𝑐

6-10

t/ha

Liska et al. (2009), Pordesimo et al. (2004), U.S. Department of Energy (2011)

𝛼𝑠

14-22

t/ha

Spatari et al. (2005)

𝑎𝑐

176

$/t

Bai et al. (2012)

𝑏𝑐

6.4 × 10−5

$/t 2

Bai et al. (2012)

𝑐𝑐

76-88

$/t

Purdue Crop Cost and Return Guide (2011), U.S. Department of Energy (2011)

𝑐𝑠

38-48

$/t

Kumar and Sokhansanj (2007), U.S. Department of Energy (2011)

𝛿𝑐

1,260,100

gal/ha

Hamilton et al. (2015)

𝛿𝑠

1,439,737

gal/ha

Hamilton et al. (2015)
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In addition to the data set in Table 5, we need more information about values of two
parameters, 𝛼𝑒 and 𝑐𝑤 . Since there are many hydroelectric dams with a range of properties,
the amount of electricity generated varies much. Water flow, height of the dam, turbine
efficiency, and other factors affect hydroelectricity generation. In case of the Hoover Dam, one
cubic foot (7.48 gallon) of water falling 8.81 feet per second generates one horsepower (0.7457
kilowatt) at 100 percent efficiency. Average head (the vertical distance water travels) the
turbine operates at is 510 to 530 feet (Colorado River and Hoover Dam, 2017). For example,
when a gallon of water falls 530 feet, it generates 6.00 kilowatt-seconds which can be
approximately converted to 0.0017 kWh/gal (𝛼𝑒 = 1.7 ∙ 10−3 ).

Given the multiplicity of water rights, allocations, and contractual arrangements that
characterize irrigation in the Unites States, there is considerable variation in the prices paid for
irrigation water. Some farmers with riparian water rights or exchange agreements with the
federal government receive water at very low cost [$5 to $10 per 1,000 m3 (264,172 gallon)],
while other farmers with less favorable contracts or those who purchase water from some statelevel irrigation agencies pay much higher prices ranging from $20 to more than $100 per
1,000 m3 (Wichelns, 2010). The government is willing to charge $5 per 1,000 m3 ,
approximately $1.89 × 10−5 per gallon as water price, and this value can be converted to
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$3.5 ∙ 10−10 /gal2 . We assume this cost to be the water supply cost in our model (𝑐𝑤 = 3.5 ∙
10−10 ).
In parameter analysis, we use the following parameters: 𝑝𝑒 = 0.01, 𝑐𝑤 = 3.5 ∙
10−10 , 𝛼𝑐 = 10, 𝛼𝑠 = 22, 𝛼𝑒 = 1.7 ∙ 10−3 , 𝑎𝑐 = 176, 𝑏𝑐 = 6.4 ∙ 10−5 , 𝑐𝑐 = 76, 𝑐𝑠 = 48, 𝑐𝑤 =
3.5 ∙ 10−10 , 𝛿𝑐 = 1,260,100, 𝛿𝑠 = 1,439,737, 𝑤 = 8 ∙ 105 , 𝑎𝑠 = 180, 𝑏𝑠 = 8.

Moreover, for policy analysis in this chapter, we only consider a situation, where the utility
company allocates its water to both farmer (Domain [2]) in the second stage, and the two
farmers compete in both corn and switchgrass markets (Case [2]) in the third stage. The
situation satisfies following conditions:

(1) 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 ≥ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

(2) 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

(3) 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤

(4) 𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) ≥ 0
(5) −𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) + 𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑑 + 𝛿𝑐 2 (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) ≥ 0
(6) 𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (−𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢 ) ≥ 0
(7) −𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) + 𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) + 3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢 + 𝛿𝑐 2 (−𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢 ) ≥ 0
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(8) 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) + 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 (2𝑤𝑑 + 𝑤𝑢 ) +
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑 ≥ 0

(9) 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) + 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑤𝑑 + 2𝑤𝑢 ) +
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢 ≥ 0

Conditions (1 ~ 3) imply Domain [2] in the second stage and Conditions (4 ~ 9) imply Case
[2] in the third stage. Through these conditions, we could find the effect of the government
subsidy on the three-stage BSC with two duopolistic markets. These conditions are applied to
Proposition 3, Proposition 4, Corollary 3, Corollary 4, Corollary 5, and Corollary 6, which we
discuss throughout this chapter.

4.1. Subsidy Discrimination

In this section, we analyze the effect of the discriminated government subsidy on the BSC.
The government makes the decision to provide different subsidies to recipients who have
different conditions. The policymakers may like to consider discriminating the subsidies
depending upon the recipients’ background and the holistic perspectives on the systems in order
to ensure efficient results, better output from less income. In this research, the downstream
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farmer may have an advantage, in that the utility company can earn additional profit from
hydroelectricity generation by water release to the downstream.

Corollary 3. If six times the supply cost per unit water from the utility company is greater than
the revenue from sale of hydroelectricity generated by unit water (6𝑐𝑤 𝑤 > 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 ) , the
following holds for the effect of the policies on the supply chain’s decision variables:

(1)

(3)

𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑑

𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠𝑑

=

=

𝜕𝑝𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑢

𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠𝑢

𝜕𝑝

𝜕𝑝

= 2 ∙ 𝜕𝑠 𝑢 = 2 ∙ 𝜕𝑠 𝑑 > 0

(2)

𝑢

𝑑

𝜕𝑞 𝑐

𝜕𝑞 𝑐

𝑑

𝑢

= −2 ∙ 𝜕𝑠 𝑢 = −2 ∙ 𝜕𝑠 𝑑 < 0

(4)

𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑑

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠𝑑

=

=

𝜕𝑤𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑢

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠𝑢

𝜕𝑤

𝜕𝑤

= − 𝜕𝑠 𝑢 = − 𝜕𝑠 𝑑 > 0
𝑢

𝑑

𝜕𝑞 𝑠

𝜕𝑞 𝑠

𝑑

𝑢

= −2 ∙ 𝜕𝑠 𝑢 = −2 ∙ 𝜕𝑠 𝑑 > 0

The proof of Corollary 3 is shown in Appendix G.
Corollary 3 reveals the reaction of the farmers and the utility company to the discriminated
government subsidies per unit output quantity to the downstream farmer (𝑠𝑑 ) and the upstream
farmer (𝑠𝑢 ). (1) The farmers would announce a higher price of water for more amounts of
subsidies per unit output quantity. A farmer in particular would announce a higher price when
subsidy to that farmer increases than when subsidy to the other farmer increases. (2) The utility
company would increase water allocation to a farmer when subsidy to that farmer increases,
whereas the water allocation to a farmer would decrease when subsidy to the other farmer
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increases. (3) A farmer would decrease corn production when subsidy to that farmer increases,
whereas a farmer would increase corn production when subsidy to the other farmer increases.
(4) On the other hand, a farmer would increase switchgrass production when subsidy to that
farmer increases, whereas a farmer would decrease switchgrass production when subsidy to the
other farmer increases.

Proposition 3. Under the discriminated government subsidies to each farmer (𝑠𝑑 ≠ 𝑠𝑢 ), the
Nash equilibrium of the BSC is as follows:

For decision variables of the BSC,

𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 = 1.769205591 ∙ 10−4 + 4.995691093 ∙ 10−13 (2𝑠𝑑 + 𝑠𝑢 )

𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 = 2.902538925 ∙ 10−4 + 4.995691093 ∙ 10−13 (𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢 )

(𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸1 = 4.404761904 ∙ 105 + 3.568350781 ∙ 10−4 (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )

(𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸1 = 3.595238096 ∙ 105 − 3.568350781 ∙ 10−4 (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.762994846 ∙ 10−1 − 9.836019102 ∙ 10−5 (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.516396465 ∙ 10−1 + 8.608796850 ∙ 10−5 (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )
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(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.120568006 ∙ 10−1 + 9.836019102 ∙ 10−5 (𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢 )

(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.516393456 ∙ 10−1 − 8.608796850 ∙ 10−5 (𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢 )

For outcomes of the BSC,

𝜋𝑑 = 3.606615295 ∙ 102 + 2.869598951 ∙ 10−5 (4𝑠𝑑 2 + 𝑠𝑢 2 ) + 1.010931575 ∙
10−1 (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) − 1.147839580 ∙ 10−4 𝑠𝑑 𝑠𝑢

𝜋𝑢 = 2.699945523 ∙ 102 + 2.86959895 ∙ 10−5 (𝑠𝑑 2 + 136𝑠𝑢 2 ) − 1.010930167 ∙
10−1 (𝑠𝑑 − 35𝑠𝑢 ) − 2.008719264 ∙ 10−3 𝑠𝑑 𝑠𝑢

𝜋ℎ = 2.571634314 ∙ 102 + 1.782637822 ∙ 10−16 (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )2 + 6.399242400 ∙
10−7 𝑠𝑑 + 5.590416224 ∙ 10−7 𝑠𝑢

𝐶𝑆𝑐 = 3.2 ∙ 10−5 [2.883562852 − 9.836047418 ∙ 10−4 (𝑠𝑑 + 𝑠𝑢 )]2

𝐶𝑆𝑠 = 4 ∙ [6.672137826 + 1.893935307 ∙ 10−3 (𝑠𝑑 + 𝑠𝑢 )]2

S𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 1.721759370 ∙ 10−4 (𝑠𝑑 2 + 𝑠𝑢 2 − 𝑠𝑑 𝑠𝑢 ) + 1.516396465 ∙ 10−1 𝑠𝑑 +
1.516393456 ∙ 10−1 𝑠𝑢

∆𝑆𝑊 = 1065.889472 − 1.43479947 ∙ 10−5 𝑠𝑑 2 + 3.773522620 ∙ 10−3 𝑠𝑢 2 +
5.05464494 ∙ 10−2 𝑠𝑑 + 3.386611930𝑠𝑢 − 1.922631296 ∙ 10−3 𝑠𝑑 𝑠𝑢
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Proposition 3 reveals the effect of the subsidies on the BSC. We could analyze the
decisions on water allocations of the utility company and the land allocations of the farmers.

For the utility company’s water allocation, the utility company allocates the entire water
to the upstream farmer with (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) ≤ −1.234397113 ∙ 109 , while the utility company
allocates the entire water to the downstream farmer with (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) ≥ 1.007534941 ∙ 109 . The
utility company would allocate water to both the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer
in case of −1.234397113 ∙ 109 < (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) < 1.007534941 ∙ 109 .

For the downstream farmer’s land allocation, the farmer produces only corn with
(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) ≤ −1.761449935 ∙ 103 , while the farmer produces only switchgrass with
(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) ≥ 1.792386562 ∙ 103 . The downstream farmer would produce both corn and
switchgrass in case of −1.761449935 ∙ 103 < (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) < 1.792386562 ∙ 103 .

For the upstream farmer’s land allocation, the farmer produces only corn with
(𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢 ) ≥ 1.761446440 ∙ 103 , while the farmer produces only switchgrass with
(𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢 ) ≤ −1.139249522 ∙ 103 . The upstream farmer would produce both corn and
switchgrass in case of −1.139249522 ∙ 103 < (𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢 ) < 1.761446440 ∙ 103 .
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Corollary 4. In the case of the discriminated government subsidy to the farmers, the following
holds for the effect of the policies on the outcome of the supply chain:

𝜕𝜋𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑑

𝜕𝜋𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢

𝜕𝜋𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑑

𝜕𝜋𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑢

𝜕𝜋ℎ
𝜕𝑠𝑑

𝜕𝜋ℎ
𝜕𝑠𝑢

= 2.021858750 ∙ 10−1 + 1.147839580 ∙ 10−4 (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )

= −1.010931575 ∙ 10−1 − 1.147839580 ∙ 10−4 (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )

= −1.010930167 ∙ 10−1 + 5.7391979 ∙ 10−5 (𝑠𝑑 − 35𝑠𝑢 )

= 3.538251276 − 5.7391979 ∙ 10−5 (35𝑠𝑑 − 136𝑠𝑢 )

= 6.399242400 ∙ 10−7 + 3.565275644 ∙ 10−16 (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )

= 5.590416224 ∙ 10−7 − 3.565275644 ∙ 10−16 (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 )

𝜕∆𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑠𝑑

𝜕∆𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑠𝑢

= 5.05464494 ∙ 10−2 − 2.86959894 ∙ 10−5 (𝑠𝑑 + 67𝑠𝑢 )

= 3.38661193 − 1.922631296 ∙ 10−3 (𝑠𝑑 − 3.925373𝑠𝑢 )

Corollary 4 reveals the effect of the government subsidies on the profits of the players, and
on the total social welfare in the BSC. We find that the effect has to do with the relation between
the subsidy to the downstream farmer (𝑠𝑑 ) and the upstream farmer (𝑠𝑢 ).
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Increasing 𝑠𝑑 in case of (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) > −1.761447144 ∙ 103 and increasing 𝑠𝑢 in case
of (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) < −8.80725488 ∙ 102 would improve the downstream farmer’s profit.
Increasing 𝑠𝑑 in case of (𝑠𝑑 − 35𝑠𝑢 ) > 1.76144852 ∙ 103 and increasing 𝑠𝑢 in case of
(35𝑠𝑑 − 136𝑠𝑢 ) < 6.16506232 ∙ 104 would improve the upstream farmer’s profit. Increasing
𝑠𝑑 in case of (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) > −1.79488013 ∙ 109 , and increasing 𝑠𝑢 in case of (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ) <
1.56801795 ∙ 109 would improve the utility company’s profit. Increasing 𝑠𝑑 in case of
(𝑠𝑑 + 67𝑠𝑢 ) < 1.76144648 ∙ 103 and increasing 𝑠𝑢 in case of (𝑠𝑑 − 3.925373𝑠𝑢 ) <
1.76144638 ∙ 103 would improve social welfare of the BSC.

4.2. Subsidy Equalization

In this section, we analyze the effect of equalized government subsidy on the BSC. The
government makes the decision to provide equal subsidies to the recipients under subsidy
equalization which is a special case of subsidy discrimination. Subsidy equalization could be
considered when policy equity is prioritized over policy efficiency, or when the advantage of
the discrimination is regarded as being insignificant. In this research, subsidy equalization could
be the justifiable policy, since both farmers produce homogeneous final products (corn and
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switchgrass) through identical technology. Note that, under this policy, if a farmer receives
subsidy, the other farmer also receives the same amount of subsidy for the same output quantity.
Here, we set 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑢 = 𝑠.

Corollary 5. If six times the supply cost per unit water from the utility company is greater than
the revenue from sale of hydroelectricity generated by unit water (6𝑐𝑤 𝑤 > 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 ) , the
following holds for the effect of the policies on the supply chain’s decision variables:

(1)

(3)

𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝜕𝑠

𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠

=

=

𝜕𝑝𝑢
𝜕𝑠

𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠

>0

(2)

<0

(4)

𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝜕𝑠

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠

=

=

𝜕𝑤𝑢
𝜕𝑠

𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠

=0

>0

The proof of Corollary 5 is shown in Appendix H.

Corollary 5 reveals the reaction of the farmers and the utility company to the equalized
government subsidies to both farmers (𝑠). (1) The farmers would announce a higher price of
water for more subsidies. (2) The change in value of the equalized subsidy does not affect the
water allocation of the utility company to the farmers. (3,4) Both farmers produce less corn and
more switchgrass for a higher subsidy.
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Proposition 4. Under equalized government subsidies to both farmers (𝑠𝑑 = 𝑠𝑢 = 𝑠), the Nash
equilibrium of the BSC is as follows:

For decision variables of the BSC,

𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 = 1.769205591 ∙ 10−4 + 1.498707328 ∙ 10−12 𝑠

𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 = 2.902538925 ∙ 10−4 + 1.498707328 ∙ 10−12 𝑠

(𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸1 = 4.404761904 ∙ 105

(𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸1 = 3.595238096 ∙ 105

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.762994846 ∙ 10−1 − 9.836047419 ∙ 10−5 𝑠
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.516396465 ∙ 10−1 + 8.608796850 ∙ 10−5 𝑠

(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.120568006 ∙ 10−1 − 9.836047419 ∙ 10−5 𝑠

(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.516393456 ∙ 10−1 + 8.608796850 ∙ 10−5 𝑠

For outcomes of the BSC,

𝜋𝑑 = 3.606615295 ∙ 102 + 1.010927174 ∙ 10−1 𝑠 + 2.86959895 ∙ 10−5 𝑠 2

𝜋𝑢 = 2.699945523 ∙ 102 + 3.437158260 ∙ 100 𝑠 + 1.922631297 ∙ 10−3 𝑠 2
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𝜋ℎ = 2.571634314 ∙ 102 + 1.198965862 ∙ 10−6 𝑠

𝐶𝑆𝑐 = 1.238372209 ∙ 10−10 (1465.813822 − 𝑠)2

𝐶𝑆𝑠 = 5.739185516 ∙ 10−7 (1761.448187 + 𝑠)2

S𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 1.721759370 ∙ 10−4 (s + 1761.448187)s

∆𝑆𝑊 = 1065.889472 + 3.437158379𝑠 + 1.836543328 ∙ 10−3 𝑠 2

Proposition 4 reveals the effect of equalized subsidy on the BSC. We can analyze the
decisions on water allocation of the utility company and the land allocation of the farmers. Both
the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer cultivate corn with 0 ≤ 𝑠 < 1.139246242 ∙
103 , while no farmer cultivates corn with 𝑠 ≥ 1.792381402 ∙ 103 . In the case of
1.139246242 ∙ 103 ≤ 𝑠 < 1.792381402 ∙ 103 , the upstream farmer does not cultivate corn
while the downstream farmer still cultivates corn.

Corollary 6. In the case of government subsidy of equal value to the farmers, the following
holds for the effect of the policy on the outcome of the supply chain:
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(1)

𝜕𝜋𝑑

(2)

𝜕𝜋𝑢

(3)

𝜕𝜋ℎ

(4)

∂∆𝑆𝑊

𝜕𝑠

𝜕𝑠

𝜕𝑠

∂s

= 1.010927174 ∙ 10−1 + 5.7391979 ∙ 10−5 𝑠

= 3.437158260 ∙ 100 + 3.845262594 ∙ 10−3 𝑠

= 1.198965862 ∙ 10−6

= 3.437158379 + 3.673086656 ∙ 10−3 𝑠

Corollary 6 reveals the effect of the equalized subsidy on the profits of the supply chain,
customer surplus in switchgrass markets, and total social welfare. According as the amount of
the equalized subsidy increases, the social welfare subtracted by the government expenditure,
and the profits of the farmers and the utility company would increase.

4.3. Results

In Chapter 4, we analyzed the effect of government subsidies on the BSC. The subsidies
are classified into two forms: (1) discriminated subsidies to the farmers (subsidy discrimination)
and (2) equal subsidies to the farmers (subsidy equalization).
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Under subsidy discrimination, the results show that the government subsidy increases
farmers’ water prices, their switchgrass production, and the utility company’s water allocation
to a farmer who receives higher subsidy than the other farmer. Depending on the relation
between the two discriminated subsidies, the subsidy policy can increase or decrease the players’
profits and the social welfare in the BSC. Also, an excessive amount of subsidy to a farmer can
cause disappearance of the corn market or monopoly of the corn market and the switchgrass
market.

Under subsidy equalization, the results show that the government subsidy to the farmers
increases farmers’ water prices and switchgrass production, and the social welfare subtracted
by the government expenditure, whereas increasing subsidy decreases corn production and does
not affect water allocation by the utility company. Compared to the discriminated subsidies, a
higher equalized subsidy would improve the farmers’ profits and the social welfare subtracted
by the government expenditure, in any case. However, excessive amount of subsidy could cause
disappearance or monopoly of a corn market.

Through parametric analysis, we found the effect of the government subsidy on the social
welfare subtracted by the government expenditure under subsidy equalization, as shown in
Figure 3, and under subsidy discrimination, as shown in Figure 4. In Figure 3, a solid line,
80

Curve (1), represents the change in social welfare subtracted by government expenditure
according as the amount of the equalized subsidy to the farmers increases from 0 to 400. In
Figure 4, a dotted line, Curve (2), represents the change in social welfare subtracted by
government expenditure according as the amount of the discriminated subsidy to the upstream
farmer increases from 0 to 800.

In Figure 1, Point [A] addresses the social welfare without any subsidy. Point [B]
represents social welfare under subsidy equalization with 𝑠𝑑 = 𝑠𝑢 = 400. In Figure 2, Point
[C], Point [D], and Point [E] represent social welfare under subsidy discrimination with the
budget of 800 for the sum of unit subsidy to the two farmers (𝑠𝑑 + 𝑠𝑢 = 800). Point [C] shows
a case where the government provides subsidy only to the downstream farmer (𝑠𝑑 = 800, 𝑠𝑢 =
0), while Point [E] shows the opposite case where the government provides subsidy only to the
upstream farmer (𝑠𝑑 = 800, 𝑠𝑢 = 0). Point [D] shows a case where the government provides
an equal amount of subsidy to both farmers (𝑠𝑑 = 400, 𝑠𝑢 = 400), which is also represented
by Point [B] in Figure 1.
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Figure 3. Social welfare subtracted by government expenditure under subsidy equalization

Figure 4. Social welfare subtracted by government expenditure under subsidy discrimination

82

From the parametric analysis, we found that both forms of subsidy policy improve social
welfare. From the perspective of the sum of the unit subsidies to the farmers, increasing the
sum of the subsidies induces higher social welfare. Under a constrained budget for the sum of
unit subsidy to the two farmers, subsidy discrimination shows higher social welfare in case of
𝑠𝑑 < 𝑠𝑢 and lower social welfare in case of 𝑠𝑑 > 𝑠𝑢 compared to subsidy equalization (𝑠𝑑 =
𝑠𝑢 ). Increasing the subsidy to the upstream farmer is more efficient in improving social welfare
than increasing the subsidy to the downstream farmer.

Therefore, the government needs to decide the amount of the subsidies while also
considering the dilemma between efficiency and equity of the policy. The effect of the subsidy
on the BSC could vary depending on policy priorities.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

We proposed a game theoretical model of a biofuel supply chain (BSC) where two farmers,
located in the downstream and the upstream, and a utility company make decisions throughout
a three-stage leader-follower Stackelberg game. In the first stage, the two farmers compete on
water price under Bertrand competition. In the second stage, the utility company allocates its
water to the two farmers based on the quoted water price by the farmers. In the third stage, the
two farmers compete on corn quantity and switchgrass quantity at a corn market and a
switchgrass market under Cournot competition. We solved the problem by using backward
induction method after deriving the KKT optimality conditions of the subproblems in each stage.

We found the equilibrium of the decisions in the BSC and conducted sensitivity analysis to
study the effect of the government subsidy on the BSC. Furthermore, we performed parametric
analysis using realistic values from the literature. The result shows that the subsidies could
improve social welfare unless they exceed certain limit that causes negative profits for farmers.
Subsidy discrimination, especially, with higher subsidy to the upstream farmer than the
downstream farmer is more efficient in improving social welfare than subsidy equalization.
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Although our model considers many realistic conditions, there are a possibility of making
the model even closer to real-world problems. In future, we could replace the corn market and
the switchgrass market with corn refineries and switchgrass refineries that are considered as
players in the game of the BSC. Water consumption in biofuel production could affect the water
supply and biomass prices. Through these extensions, we could analyze the reaction of the
refineries to the decisions of the farmers and the utility company. Moreover, future research
could consider the land type, yield amount, precipitation along with uncertainty in crop
production for a multi-period model. This problem can be modeled through stochastic
programming which is rarely used in research on the BSC.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A.
Appendix A shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Section 3.2.1.3.
Appendix A.1.
Appendix A.1. represents proof of Case [2] in Table 3.
(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝒒𝒄𝒖 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝒒𝒄𝒅 − 𝛿𝑐 𝜆1 = 0

(A-1-1)

(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝒒𝒔𝒖 + 𝑠𝑑 ) − 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝒒𝒔𝒅 − 𝛿𝑠 𝜆1 = 0

(A-1-2)

(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝒒𝒄𝒅 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝒒𝒄𝒖 − 𝛿𝑐 𝜆4 = 0

(A-1-3)

(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝒒𝒔𝒅 + 𝑠𝑢 ) − 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝒒𝒔𝒖 − 𝛿𝑠 𝜆4 = 0

(A-1-4)

𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝒒𝒄𝒅 − 𝛿𝑠 𝒒𝒔𝒅 = 0

(A-1-5)

𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝒒𝒄𝒖 − 𝛿𝑠 𝒒𝒔𝒖 = 0

(A-1-6)

From Equation (A-1-1), Equation (A-1-3), Equation (A-1-2), and Equation (A-1-4), we
derive outputs from the duopolistic corn market and the duopolistic switchgrass market,
respectively.
𝑞𝑑𝑐 =

(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )

𝑞𝑑𝑠 =

(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )

3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2

3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2

+
+

𝛿𝑐 (−2𝜆1 +𝜆4 )
3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2
(2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2

+

𝛿𝑠 (−2𝜆1 +𝜆4 )
3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2

𝑞𝑢𝑐 =

(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )

𝑞𝑢𝑠 =

(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )

3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2

3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2

+
+

𝛿𝑐 (𝜆1 −2𝜆4 )
3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2
(−𝑠𝑑 +2𝑠𝑢 )
3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2

+

𝛿𝑠 (𝜆1 −2𝜆4 )
3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2

Then we derive 𝜆2 and 𝜆4 by putting the above outputs into Equation (A-1-5) and
Equation (A-1-6) as follows:
𝜆1 =
𝜆4 =

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
2

2

(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 )
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
2

2

(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 )

𝑏 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (2𝑤𝑑 +𝑤𝑢 )

− (𝑏𝑐

𝑐 𝛼𝑐

2𝛿
𝑠

2

+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐

2

+ (𝑏
)

𝑐 𝛼𝑐

𝑏 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑤𝑑 +2𝑤𝑢 )

− (𝑏𝑐

𝑐 𝛼𝑐

Then the best responses are follows:
95

2𝛿
𝑠

2

+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐

2

+ (𝑏
)

𝑐 𝛼𝑐

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2 𝛿 2 +𝑏 𝛼 2 𝛿 2 )
𝑠
𝑠 𝑠 𝑐

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2 𝛿 2 +𝑏 𝛼 2 𝛿 2 )
𝑠
𝑠 𝑠 𝑐

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 =
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 =
(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 =
(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )
𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

+

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )

3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑑

3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑑
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )
3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑢

3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

+

+

+

3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (−2𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )
𝛿𝑐 2 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )
𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 −2𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

𝛿𝑐 2 (−𝑠𝑑 +2𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

Appendix A.2.
Appendix A.2. represents proof of Case [3] in Table 3.
(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝒒𝒄𝒖 − 𝛿𝑐 𝜆4 = 0

(A-2-1)

(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢 ) − 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝒒𝒔𝒖 − 𝛿𝑠 𝜆4 = 0

(A-2-2)

𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐 𝒒𝒄𝒖 − 𝛿𝑠 𝒒𝒔𝒖 = 0

(A-2-3)

From Equation (A-2-1) and Equation (A-2-2), we derive a new equation as follows:
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝒒𝒄𝒖 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝒒𝒔𝒖 =

𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 +𝑠𝑢 )

(A-2-4)

2

𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 , and 𝜆4 are derived by solving the simultaneous equations, Equation (A-2-3) and
Equation (A-2-4), as follows:
𝒒𝒄𝒖 =
𝒒𝒔𝒖 =
𝜆4 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
2

2

(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 )

+

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

2 +
)

𝛿𝑐 2 𝑠𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

−2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤𝑢

+ (𝑏

𝑐 𝛼𝑐

2𝛿
𝑠

2

+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐

Appendix A.3.
Appendix A.3. represents proof of Case [4] in Table 3.
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2

+ (𝑏
)

𝑐 𝛼𝑐

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2 𝛿 2 +𝑏 𝛼 2 𝛿 2 )
𝑠
𝑠 𝑠 𝑐

(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝒒𝒄𝒖 ) − 2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝒒𝒄𝒅 − 𝛿𝑐 𝜆1 = 0

(A-3-1)

(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝒒𝒔𝒖 + 𝑠𝑑 ) − 2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝒒𝒔𝒅 − 𝛿𝑠 𝜆1 = 0

(A-3-2)

𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐 𝒒𝒄𝒅 − 𝛿𝑠 𝒒𝒔𝒅 = 0

(A-3-3)

From Equation (A-3-1) and Equation (A-3-2), we derive a new equation as follows:
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝒒𝒄𝒖 − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝒒𝒔𝒖 =

𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 +𝑠𝑢 )

(A-3-4)

2

𝑞𝑢𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢𝑠 , and 𝜆4 are derived by solving the simultaneous equations, Equation (A-3-3) and
Equation (A-3-4), as follows:
𝒒𝒄𝒅 =
𝒒𝒔𝒅 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑑
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑑
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )

𝜆1 =

(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

+

𝛿𝑐 2 𝑠𝑑
2
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

−2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤𝑑

+ (𝑏

2 2
2 2
𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝛿𝑠 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 )

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2
2
2 2
𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝛿𝑠 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 )

+ (𝑏

Appendix B.
Appendix B shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Corollary 1 in
Subsection 3.2.1.4.
𝑐
)
𝜕(𝑞𝑑

𝐵𝑅

𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝑠
)
𝜕(𝑞𝑑

𝑠 𝛼𝑠

𝐵𝑅

𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝑐
)
𝜕(𝑞𝑑

= (𝑏
= (𝑏

𝑠 𝛼𝑠

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐
2 𝛿 2 +𝑏 𝛼 2 𝛿 2 )
𝑐
𝑐 𝑐 𝑠

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
2 𝛿 2 +𝑏 𝛼 2 𝛿 2 )
𝑐
𝑐 𝑐 𝑠

>0
>0

=0
=0

𝐵𝑅

𝜕𝑤𝑢

=0
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𝑠
)
𝜕(𝑞𝑑

𝐵𝑅

𝜕𝑤𝑢
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑤𝑢
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑤𝑢

=0
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐
2
2
2 2
𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝛿𝑠 )

= (𝑏
= (𝑏

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢

𝑠 𝛼𝑠

2 𝛿 2 +𝑏 𝛼 2 𝛿 2 )
𝑐
𝑐 𝑐 𝑠

>0
>0

The above results are only applied to a case of:
𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑑 −𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑑 +𝛿𝑐 2 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

≥0
≥0

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤𝑢 −𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (−𝑠𝑑 +2𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤𝑢 +𝛿𝑐 2 (−𝑠𝑑 +2𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

≥0
≥0

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 (2𝑤𝑑 +𝑤𝑢 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛼𝑠 2 (𝑤𝑑 +2𝑤𝑢 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

≥0
≥0

Appendix C.
Appendix C shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Table 4 in
Subsection 3.2.2.4. Best responses of the utility company in the second stage could be derived
by using the KKT conditions of the utility company’s problem as follows:
ℒ3 = 𝜋ℎ + 𝜆7 (𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ) + 𝜆8 𝒘𝒅 + 𝜆9 𝒘𝒖
𝜕ℒ3
𝜕𝒘𝒅
𝜕ℒ3
𝜕𝒘𝒖

(C-1)

= 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 = 0

(C-2)

= 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆9 = 0

(C-3)

0 ≤ 𝜆7 ⊥ [𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ] ≥ 0

(C-4)
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0 ≤ 𝜆8 ⊥ [𝒘𝒅 ] ≥ 0

(C-5)

0 ≤ 𝜆9 ⊥ [𝒘𝒖 ] ≥ 0

(C-6)

We have eight cases for positivity of 𝜆7 , 𝜆8 , and 𝜆8 , since each lambda can be equal to or
greater than zero.
(1) 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 0
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 = 0

(C-1-2)

𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-1-3)

𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(C-1-4)

𝒘𝒅 ≥ 0

(C-1-5)

𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(C-1-6)
𝒘𝒅 =

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒
𝑝𝑢
, 𝒘𝒖 =
, 𝜆 = 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 0
2𝑐𝑤
2𝑐𝑤 7

(2) 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 > 0
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 = 0

(C-2-2)

𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 + 𝜆9 = 0

(C-2-3)

𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(C-2-4)

𝒘𝒅 ≥ 0

(C-3-5)

𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-2-6)

𝒘𝒅 =

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒
, 𝒘𝒖 = 0, 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = −𝑝𝑢
2𝑐𝑤

This solution is infeasible, since 𝑝𝑢 > 0 results in 𝜆9 < 0.
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(3) 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 > 0, 𝜆9 = 0
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 + 𝜆8 = 0

(C-3-2)

𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-3-3)

𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(C-3-4)

𝒘𝒅 = 0

(C-3-5)

𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(C-3-6)
𝒘𝒅 = 0, 𝒘𝒖 =

𝑝𝑢
, 𝜆 = 0, 𝜆8 = −𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 , 𝜆9 = 0
2𝑐𝑤 7

This solution is infeasible, since 𝑝𝑑 > 0 and 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 > 0 result in 𝜆8 < 0.

(4) 𝜆7 > 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 0
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 = 0

(C-4-2)

𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 = 0

(C-4-3)

𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-4-4)

𝒘𝒅 ≥ 0

(C-4-5)

𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(C-4-6)

𝒘𝒅 =

𝑝𝑑 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 −𝑝𝑢 +2𝑐𝑤 𝑤
4𝑐𝑤

, 𝒘𝒖 =

−𝑝𝑑 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +𝑝𝑢 +2𝑐𝑤 𝑤
4𝑐𝑤

, 𝜆7 =

𝑝𝑑 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +𝑝𝑢 −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤
2

, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 0

(5) 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 > 0, 𝜆9 > 0
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 + 𝜆8 = 0

(C-5-2)

𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 + 𝜆9 = 0

(C-5-3)

𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(C-5-4)

𝒘𝒅 = 0

(C-5-5)
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𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-5-6)
𝒘𝒅 = 0, 𝒘𝒖 = 0, 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = −𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 , 𝜆9 = −𝑝𝑢

This solution is infeasible, since 𝑝𝑑 > 0, 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 > 0, and 𝑝𝑢 > 0 result in 𝜆8 < 0 and 𝜆9 < 0.

(6) 𝜆7 > 0, 𝜆8 > 0, 𝜆9 = 0
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 = 0

(C-6-2)

𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 = 0

(C-6-3)

𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-6-4)

𝒘𝒅 = 0

(C-6-5)

𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0

(C-6-6)
𝒘𝒅 = 0, 𝒘𝒖 = 𝑤, 𝜆7 = 𝑝𝑢 , 𝜆8 = −𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 , 𝜆9 = 0

(7) 𝜆7 > 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 > 0
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 = 0

(C-7-2)

𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆9 = 0

(C-7-3)

𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-7-4)

𝒘𝒅 ≥ 0

(C-7-5)

𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-7-6)
𝒘𝒅 = 𝑤, 𝒘𝒖 = 0, 𝜆7 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 , 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢

(8) 𝜆7 > 0, 𝜆8 > 0, 𝜆9 > 0
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 = 0

(C-8-2)

𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆9 = 0

(C-8-3)
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𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-8-4)

𝒘𝒅 = 0

(C-8-5)

𝒘𝒖 = 0

(C-8-6)
𝒘𝒅 = 0, 𝒘𝒖 = 0

This solution is infeasible, since 𝑤 should be positive.

Appendix D.
Appendix D shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Corollary 2 in
Section 3.2.2.4.
𝜕𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑤𝑢

𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝜕𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑢
𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑤𝑢

𝜕𝑝𝑢

1

= 4𝑐 > 0
𝑤

−1

= 4𝑐 < 0
𝑤

−1

= 4𝑐 < 0
𝑤

1

= 4𝑐 > 0
𝑤

The above results are only applied to a case of:
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 ≥ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤,
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤 𝑤,
and
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤.
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Appendix E.
Appendix E shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Proposition 1 in
Section 3.2.3.3. From the farmers’ KKT conditions in the first stage, Equations (53), (54), (55),
and (56), we have two equations for 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑢 .
[(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 }]
𝐵𝑅

(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 }]

𝑠
𝜕(𝑞𝑑
)

𝜕𝑝𝑑

𝐵𝑅

+ 𝑠𝑑

𝑠
𝜕(𝑞𝑑
)

𝜕𝑝𝑑

− 𝑤𝑑 𝐵𝑅 −

𝑠 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑢

+ 𝑠𝑢

𝑠 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑢

− 𝑤𝑢 𝐵𝑅 −

𝐵𝑅

𝜕𝑝𝑑

𝜕𝑤𝑑 𝐵𝑅
𝑝𝑑
𝜕𝑝𝑑

[(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 ) − 𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 }]
(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 }]

𝑐
𝜕(𝑞𝑑
)

=0

𝑐 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑢

𝜕𝑤𝑢 𝐵𝑅
𝑝𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑢

+ [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 +

(E-1)

+ [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 ) − 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 {(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 +

=0

(E-2)

We have the following results from the best responses of the utility company in the second
stage and the farmers in the third stage:
(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 =
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 =
𝐵𝑅

𝑐
𝜕(𝑞𝑑
)

=

𝜕𝑝𝑑

=

𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑢

=

𝑠 )𝐵𝑅
𝜕(𝑞𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑢

=

3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−2𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐)+2𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 )
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐
4𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

𝐵𝑅

𝑠
𝜕(𝑞𝑑
)

2𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−2𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 )

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
4𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐
4𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
4𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2𝛿𝑠 2 )

𝜕𝑤𝑑 𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑑

= 4𝑐

𝜕𝑤𝑢 𝐵𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑢

= 4𝑐

1
𝑤

1
𝑤

We substitute the above values into Equation (E-1) and Equation (E-2) as follows:
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2𝛿 2 (𝑎 𝛼 −𝑐 𝛼 )−2𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 )
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 [(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 ( 𝑠 𝑐 𝑐 𝑐 𝑐
)]
2 2
2 2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝛿𝑠 )

2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )
2
2
−2𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+2𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 )
)]
2
2
2
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝛿𝑠 )
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )

+

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (

+

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 )

2𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 = 0

−

(E-1’)

2𝛿 2 (𝑎 𝛼 −𝑐 𝛼 )−2𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 )
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 [(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 ( 𝑠 𝑐 𝑐 𝑐 𝑐
)]
2 2
2 2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 𝛿𝑠 )
2
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )

−2𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+2𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 )
)]
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )

+

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 [(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (

+

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 )

𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 = 0

+

(E-2’)

Then we can simplify Equation (E-1’) and Equation (E-2’) as follows:
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 [(3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (−3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 ))]
2

3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 [(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (−3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 ))]
2

3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )

+

− 2𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 = 0

(E-1’’)

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 [(3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )(𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 (−3𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 ))]
2

3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 [(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )(𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 (−3𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑠𝑑 +𝑠𝑢 ))]
2

3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )

+

+ 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 = 0

+

+

(E-2’’)

Then we can simplify Equation (X-1’’) and Equation (X-2’’) further as follows:
𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 )

+

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 )

2𝑐𝑤 𝑤) = 0

+ (−2𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 −
(E-1’’’)
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𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 )

+

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐2 𝛿𝑠 )

2𝑐𝑤 𝑤) = 0

+ (𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑝𝑢 −
(E-2’’’)

Then we find the equilibrium values of 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑢 after solving the above simultaneous
equations, as follows:
𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 = 𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 +

2𝐵𝑑 +𝐵𝑢 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒
3

𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 = 𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑤 𝑤 +

𝐵𝑑 +2𝐵𝑢 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒
3

, where
𝐴=

𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )−𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝑤
2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )

𝐵𝑑 =
and 𝐵𝑢 =

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑

,

,

2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢

.

2
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2𝛿𝑐 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 )

Appendix F.
Appendix F shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Section 3.2.4.
Appendix F.1.
Appendix F.1 represents proof of Proposition 2-1 which demonstrates Equilibrium of
Domain [2]. Under the conditions of (2-1) 𝐵𝑑 + 𝐵𝑢 ≥ 6𝑐𝑤 𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝐴, (2-2) 𝐵𝑑 − 𝐵𝑢 ≥
−𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 6𝑐𝑤 𝑤 , and (2-3) 𝐵𝑑 − 𝐵𝑢 ≤ −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 6𝑐𝑤 𝑤 , the best responses of the utility
company for the water allocation of Domain [2] in the second stage are as follows:
𝑤𝑑𝐵𝑅 =

𝑝𝑑 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 −𝑝𝑢 +2𝑐𝑤 𝑤
4𝑐𝑤

𝑤𝑢𝐵𝑅 =

−𝑝𝑑 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +𝑝𝑢 +2𝑐𝑤 𝑤
4𝑐𝑤
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In Domain [2], we find the equilibrium values of the utility company’s decision on water
allocation by substituting 𝑝𝑑 𝑁𝐸 and 𝑝𝑢 𝑁𝐸 into the best responses of the water allocations in
the second stage, as follows:
(𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸1 =

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠

(𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸1 = −

2 +
)

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠

(𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

2 +
)

(−𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

Then, we find the equilibrium values of the farmers’ decisions on land allocation by
substituting (𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸1 and (𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸1 into the best responses of the land allocation in the third
stage, as follows:
(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 =
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 =
(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 =
(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 =

4𝑐𝑤 [𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )]+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (𝐵𝑑 −𝐵𝑢 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)−4𝑐𝑤 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−4𝑐𝑤 [𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )]+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (𝐵𝑑 −𝐵𝑢 +𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)+4𝑐𝑤 𝛿𝑐 2 (2𝑠𝑑 −𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
4𝑐𝑤 [𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )]+𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 (−𝐵𝑑 +𝐵𝑢 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)+4𝑐𝑤 𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑠𝑑 −2𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−4𝑐𝑤 [𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )]+𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 (−𝐵𝑑 +𝐵𝑢 −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 +6𝑐𝑤 𝑤)−4𝑐𝑤 𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑠𝑑 −2𝑠𝑢 )
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

Appendix F.2.
Appendix F.2 represents proof of Proposition 2-2 which demonstrates Equilibrium of
Domain [3]. Under Condition (3-1) of 𝐵𝑑 − 𝐵𝑢 ≤ −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 − 6𝑐𝑤 𝑤, the equilibrium values of
the utility company’s decision on the water allocations of Domain [3] in the second stage are
as follows:
(𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸2 = 0
(𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸2 = 𝑤
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In Domain [3], the corn market and the switchgrass market are the monopoly of the
upstream farmer since the downstream farmer does not produce any crop in the third stage. The
equilibrium values of the farmers’ decision on the land allocation of Domain [3] in the third
stage are as follows:
(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 = 0
(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 = 0
(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 =
(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )
−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 2 𝑠𝑢
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

Appendix F.3.
Appendix F.3 represents proof of Proposition 2-2 which demonstrates Equilibrium of
Domain [4]. Under Condition (3-1) of 𝐵𝑑 − 𝐵𝑢 ≥ −𝑝𝑒 𝛼𝑒 + 6𝑐𝑤 𝑤, the equilibrium values of
the utility company’s decision on the water allocations of Domain [4] in the second stage are
as follows:
(𝑤𝑑 )𝑁𝐸3 = 𝑤
(𝑤𝑢 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0
In Domain [4], the corn market and the switchgrass market are the monopoly of the upstream
farmer since the downstream farmer does not produce any crop in the third stage. The
equilibrium values of the farmers’ decision on the land allocation of Domain [4] in the third stage are
as follows:

(𝑞𝑑𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 =

𝛿𝑠 2 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 𝑤−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )
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(𝑞𝑑𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 =

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠 (𝑎𝑐 𝛼𝑐 −𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝑐 )+𝛿𝑐 2 (𝑎𝑠 𝛼𝑠 −𝑐𝑠 𝛼𝑠 )+2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑤+𝛿𝑐 2 𝑠𝑑
2(𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 +𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 )

(𝑞𝑢𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0
(𝑞𝑢𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0

Appendix G.
Appendix G shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Corollary 3 in
Section 4.1.
𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑑
𝜕𝑝𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑑
𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑢
𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑑
𝜕𝑤𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑑
𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢
𝜕𝑤𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑢
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠𝑑
𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠𝑑
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠𝑑

=
=

2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 𝑠𝑑
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0
>0

=

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0

=

2𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
12𝑐𝑤 (𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−2𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
2𝛿𝑐 2
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0
<0
<0
>0

<0
>0
>0
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𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠𝑑
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠𝑢
𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠𝑢
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠𝑢
𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠𝑢

=
=
=
=
=

−𝛿𝑐 2
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−𝛿𝑐 2
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−2𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
2𝛿𝑐 2
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

<0
>0
<0
<0
>0

Appendix H.
Appendix H shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Corollary 4 in
Section 4.2.
𝜕𝑝𝑑
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝑝𝑢
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝑤𝑢
𝜕𝑠
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠
𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑑

𝜕𝑠
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠
𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑢

𝜕𝑠

=

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0

=

𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠
2
(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

>0

=0
=0
=
=
=
=

−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝛿𝑐 2
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
−𝛿𝑐 𝛿𝑠
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 2 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )
𝛿𝑐 2
2
3(𝑏𝑠 𝛼𝑠 𝛿𝑐 2 +𝑏𝑐 𝛼𝑐 2 𝛿𝑠 2 )

<0
>0
<0
>0
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